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The specific contribution and activities of Jews as socialists, or socialist Jews
has largely been ignored by the historians both of the Jews in South Africa and of
the. labour and left wing movements in this country. The former, represented most
prominently in a volume edited by Gustas Saron and Louis Hotz , have argued that
South African Jews are a 'fairly hbmogeneci's group' who .'as a group as opposed
to individuals... have played no part in politics.... Therefore general political
3
questions have no place in the history of the Jewish community.' As exceptions
to this rule the authors mention the role the Jews played in the struggle against
Kruger, the imposition of various immigration restrictions and the fight against
4
anti-semitism. Moreover, Saron and Hotz contend that "The majority of East
European immigrants were deeply imbued with the ideals of Jewish nationalism.
Overseas they had been in varying degrees supporters of the Cbovevei 2ion (Lovers
of Zion movement).1 'There were some socialists but few found their way to
South Africa* Indeed Saron claims that by 1907 the Bundist tendencies in South
8
Africa had lost all impetus and soon disappeared from the scene.
If the historians of the Jews have been amiss in their discussion of Jewish socialist
organisation, the sane charge must be levelled at those histories of the labour and
left wing organisations of South Africa. Aside from a few personal references in
9
the writings of Eddie Roux , himself a teacher at the various classes organised by
the Jewish Workers Club (the focus of this paper), I have uncovered no reference to
Jewish socialist organisation in the few general histories of working class and left
wing activities in this country. As I hope to show in this paper, such an absence
is unjustified and unfortunate given the important role of organised Jewish socialist
activity, particularly in the period under discussion. Jewish socialists and their
organisations played a vital part in the formation and activities of 'the left1 in
this country and if we are to have an accurate picture of 'the lefc movement' then
this role must be recognised and placed in its proper perspective. At this juncture
however, an important point must be raised with regard to the sources available to .
me, and the bias that this has introduced into the paper.
To a large extent the paper follows the documentary and oral evidence currently
available. The written records of the Jewish Workers Club itself do net seen to
exist. The Club members burnt their own records, while a fire at the Club's
premises in Doornfontein destroyed any official records that might have been kept.
Thus the evidence uncovered reveals Club activities that are of concern to newspaper:
such as the Forward or the political historians such as Roux. This documentary
evidence therefore reflects those parts of tihe Club's activities which were or cotice:
to the political activists and their writings.
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0ijt Similarly the people who were willing to be interviewed were those who in the main
S$ w e r e m o s C politically conscious and politically involved. Some people who were
'»,;;.;j involved mi ordinary members refused to be interviewed.
#v'} Finally, niwl perhaps most importantly, the paper is biased by the fact that I am
"HJV not a Lit'm-'mian immigrant who speaks Yiddish. This says volumes for the gaps in
-if*. A the paper. I neither have a sense of Yiddishkeit nor the particular brand of
Yiddish humour or expression characteristic of the members of the Club. In addition
I do not have a full appreciation of the acute social need those who were newly
'•£$ arrived must have had for 'zein eigene mensen1. The function of the club as a
<;v.;-: landschaft.' must therefore be stressed at the outset. Its social content, as
,
vV; opposed to its political activities, must be given due cognizance from the outset.
One must not lose sight of the fact that the majority of members were concerned with
Yiddish culture and expression. They came to the Club as a social meeting place.
Many of them were not involved in some of the activities discussed and were immersed
in the cultural aspects of the Club.
%>k T n u s while it is true that the historical importance of the Club is in its more
•M general role vis-a-vis the !left movement1, merely to consider it as such and not
5'Vv^ t0 acta^owliMge its existence as an independent entity with a cultural momentum,
:^,
;| would be historically inaccurate.
i/£ Although a number of individual Jewish socialists were active in South Africa from
vp]< an early iwiod it is not until the 1890's that Jewish workers as an active and
. '•' ' •$..{/* organised ;u*oup emerge. This emergence would correspond with the first major wave
•;';':< . 1 2 .
••}'[ of Jewish umnigration from Eastern Europe. As Esra Mendelsohn point out, to be
'<V.-:v
y.y Jewish in t.hc Pale of Russia meant more often than not to be part of a poverty
..'>'v> stricken w s s . Jews in Russia during this period were structurally inclined to
V,>v operate within worker and socialist organisations and it is not until 1905 that
I'.O': Zionism cr,\ clain to be a major force in Europe . Jews lived in poverty-
'•) i:, _ i
>';/. stricken conditions in South Africa as well during this period and the socialist
i-lL ideology t>.ey had been exposed to and accepted in Eastern Europe was prominent
'';•:•} u n d e r simtl^r conditions in this country.
i-' •
>,' In the lS-'O's a Jewish Workers Club was established in Johannesburg. It was headed
,$•: by Englis** Speaking Jews who were pro-Boer in outlook and at one stage had a member-
s'./i . 15
••-/] ship roll exceeding 600. It dissolved in August 1902. In 1896 a Jewish Working
.•?.'•: Men's Clu> .^ nd Night School acquired its own premises also in Johannesburg.
•^-'- 1898 the s'i-vish tailors in the Cape hold a meeting 'to protest against sweat shops
S 3/...
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and other evils.1 In 1901 another Jewish Working Mens Club was formed in Cape
18
Town while in 1902 the Cape Jewish Bakers organised a trade union 'with the object
19
•of increasing wages and reducing Sunday labour.1
We begin to get an indication of the strength and importance of the Jewish workers
in this period by the appearance of Yiddish as a language of the left. At the first
Labour Day demonstration ever held in Johannesburg on April 1 1904, a Yiddish speaker
addressed the crowd. A pamphlet by W.H. Andrews "The Workers Revolution in Russia
21
was translated into 'Afrikaans and Jewish1 As late as 1930 we find a suggestion
being put to a general meeting of the Garment Workers Union to the effect that Yiddis
22
should be used officially by the Union.
In 1905, under the impetus of the Russian Revolution of that year, a 'Friends of
Russian Freedom Society1 was established in Johannesburg. According to Rochling
it was a Jewish organization, strongly Bundist in outlook and particularly active
during the visit of a.Russian Bundist, Serge Rieger. At this point in time the
picture of a homogeneous Jewry is certainly not valid. In addition to the cultural
and religious tensions between Eastern European Jewry on the one hand and the Jews
25
of English and German origin on the other, tensions so ably described by Herrman,
26
and Saron and Hotz , we find major political differences in the community. In 1905
an opposition group to the Friends of Russian Freedom emerges. A meeting is held i
December of that year to consider the establishment of an organisation to support the
Zionist self defence movement in Russia. Rochlin reports that the meeting met with
some opposition from the Bundists. '...this meeting concluded with the singing of
'Hatikvah' by the Zionists, who waved blue and white handkerchiefs and the chanting
27
of the Marsseilles by the Bundists who carried red handkerchiefs.'
As early as 1905 we see two themes which are to characterise this as:.cct of Jewish
history for the next 35 years. In the first place we see clashes between Zionists
and anti-Zionists (which also has a religion/anti-religion conflict intertwined
within it) which occur with unfailing regularity in the 1930's when the Jewish
Workers Club organises picnics on Yom Kuppur or on a more serious level with the
visit of the revisionist Zionist leader, Jabotinsky (described in the Club newspaper,
1O Oft
the Proletarishe Sthime as a 'Zionist Hitler1 ) to South Africa in 193D and 1937.
Secondly we see the intervention of international issues as the dominant feature of
political organisation among left wing Jews. This is, of course, a reflection of
the origin, and the cultural and political home of these movements during this perioc
Although I shall not be concerned to argue this point here, a similar point can be
30
made for left wing movements generally during this.period.
-4-
*$ it is important to note the j-deological underpinnings of the clashes noted above.
5$ In contrast to the Zionists v/no are concerned to argue that Jews qua Jews are a
••H:{ homogeneous group with similar interests, the Bund, and the various anti-Bundist,
ijij but socialist groupings both In Europe and South Africa, point to the class divisions
&} within Jewish society which 'Jeny a common 'Jewishness1 . The point is made in an
fy'i article by H.W.H. entitled ' V'Jie Jews and Nationalists'. He argues: * If there are
'& Jews in the Revolutionary rr/r/ement, it is also true that there are Jews in the most
'.'••'I conservative camps which boiled down means simply that the class struggle dominates
v*$ Jewish society just the same as any other national society. The Jewish working class
i^ s willy nilly will have to takfr sides with their class of all nations ... Nationalism
>}::;', 3 1
(••£ is a weapon of capitalism and a snare and a delusion. 1 This argument is repeated
t-V in the Thirties when the Jew;sh Workers Club denounces German Jewish bourgeoisie for
. ) • ' • 32
iV' co-operating with Hitler on the basis of its capitalist interests.
%,
:''% Although we find a Jewish Socialist Society involved in the production of fThe
••**•'
i
 "\o -
.';.:,! Bolshevik1, the official orgaai of the Industrial Socialist League, the most
important organisation for o\>r purposes, and the immediate forerunner of the J.W.C.
was the Jewish Speaking Branch of the International Socialist League (hereafter
called the JSB). It has already been mentioned that Yiddish speakers were prominent
i?$ at socialist rallies in Johannesburg, or more particularly in the Fordsburg/Vrededorp
W . 34
%':j areas of Johannesburg where Jewish immigrants and workers lived. One such meeting
'& 35
.£• is described in graphic deta;l in a report in the International.
;.]: "A capital operi air election meeting was held last Sunday
*•<• afternoon at t'.e traditional corner of West and Commissioner
!•<{< , streets. The meeting was announced by a Jewish manifesto
'.'/•'• which was distributed all over the district on the Sunday
V:' morning and an .attendance of several hundred was the result.
'•A The speakers, except the candidate, all spoke in 'Yiddish1
'K and with the h:.-Tiour peculiar to such vernacular created a
ffi deep impressio'i on the audience. Indeed the campaign has
•fj brought forward four excellent new speakers who will certainly
.*'y: be called upor; again. . . Before nomination, Comrade Bunting
'['h
 w a s approached ;->y divers (sic) parties, one in close contact
]!,;! with the Ortho'-O* Jewish Board of Deputies, and with others
';' being alleged 'socialists1, to desist from proceeding with
f
'':
fl
: the election o"- at any rate from holding public meetings on
t\i the ground ths*- there would be a riot, or worse still a pogrom
of shopkeepers windows. The inference can hardly be avoided
}'-. • that such rumo'-^s originally emanated from the camp of one or
other
 of the r-val candidates. They have of course been
V ignored.
' • • i
* • ; '
." Tliis interest group is forrc^-ised in the formation of a Jewish Speaking Branch
of the 1 S L The first me-'* ting, presided over by Comrade Israelstam, attracted
/' 5/...
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'50 - 60 comrades1. A number of features of the JSBfs activities should be noted,
for they e«cur in the activities of the JWC.
In the first place the group was concerned to advocate 'revolutionary socialism* on
the 'Jewish street* - a phrase used by one of the former chairman of the JWC, S.Buirski
37to denote the activities of the Club 'amongst the Jewish masses'. Secondly we see
the establishment of a separate Jewish organisation which maintains close links with
38
the 'party of the working class'. The JSB justified its existence as a separate
organisation because '...they are getting in touch with many new members who had
hitherto taken only a spectators interest in the ISL but who have been fired by the
39
Russian Revolution to link up with the organised socialist movement'.
It is interesting to note that this separation of organisation runs counter to Lenin's
position on the Bund as a separate Jewish workers organisation in Eastern Europe.
40Owing to Lenin's opposition to a separate workers' organization the Bund was forced
to leave the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1903
41
although it re-entered the party in 1906. It remained to play an important role
42in the Russian revolutionary movement until 1917 but was dissolved after the
revolution.
Indeed this tension between a workers movement, and a Jewish workers movement is to
run through the history of specifically Jewish socialist organisation in South Africa.
At a formative meeting of the*:Communist Party of South Africa, to which a formal
document from the Jewish Socialist Society (Poalei Zion) (which seems to be a
different group from the JSB) was submitted 'It was decided, subject to the approval
of the Third International, which has before it the question of the affiliation of the
Paolei Zion, as a whole, to agree to the inclusion of the Jewish Socialist Society
43(Paolei Zion) as a Jewish National Branch'.
Thus the organisation of a Jewish socialist group seeras to have been permitted for
practical reasons. \ An issue of the official organ of the JWC, the Proletarishe
4I#-Shtime stated : The JWC is a product of the commencement of a process of
radicalisation in Jewish circles, as well as the emergence of a group of revolutionary
immigrants who were unable to find the opportunities to continue their revolutionary
work in the existing liberal, petty bourgeois organisations. This compelled them to
lay the foundations of the JWC around which there occurred later a concentration of
class conscious elements among the Jews.' It should be stressed though, that while
both the JSB and the JWC approved of separate organisation, this was linked firmly to
the ISL and SACP and did not have the federalist intentions of the Bund. In fact the
6/...
JWC was anti-Bundist.
A second important feature of the JSB is its function as an .important financier
of left wing organisations. At the first meeting the branch considered a
10,000 shilling fund to acquire a printing press for the ISL . The press was
46finally acquired in 1919 . Similarly we find that the largest contributor to
a!strike fund for the workers belonging to the Silverton Tannery and Boot and
SHoeworkers Union are the JSB with a donation of £11.16.9 The next largest
donation from the Management Committees Vote (presumably of the ISL) is £5.0.0.,
while the third largest donation is £1.0.0. from the Pretoria Branch of the I.S.L.
47The Fund closed at £30.3.10 . In addition the pages of the International often
advertise fundraising socials, plays and entertainment evenings arranged and
organised by the JSB.
r"j$ The third enduring feature of the activities of the JSB concerns their educational
''^  and propaganda activities. The following is typical of the notices of their
• • y ' • • • ' 4 8f/tl activities during this period
$:'*' "On Sunday 13th instant an open air meeting will be held at
|^i the corner of Ferreira and Commissioner Streets. Speakers
iisj (in Yiddish) Comrades S. Datnowsky, I. Kessler, C.H. Traub.
|;|, The study class will meet at the Palmerstone Hall on Wed-
%$ nesday 16th instant at 8 p.m. A lecture will be given on
•£$ /Nationalism and Internationalism. 1 Comrades and Friends
£.' invited."
•;'';t It is against this background of Jewish socialist activity that we can begin to
;
-:1 describe and understand the" emergence of the JWC as the most prominent, well
,';;v organised and long lasting of the organisations of the Jewish left. Before turning
•;?j specifically to the Club itself, however, it is important to situate it in the.
';;$ environment and history of a particular section of Johannesburg Jewry between 1928
j£ and 194O*9.
'?/• The years between 1924-30 saw a noticeable rise in the number of Jews entering
'•'•-• 50
''!": South Africa as immigrants . Between 1921 and 1936 the Jewish population of
;;; +e *o* ^
*•.' South Africa rose from 62,103 to 71,816 , and the majority of these were from
• : •> 52
i•; Eastern Europe . In a survey undertaken in 1968 Dubb found that 70% of
':-.» Johannesburg Jews were descendants of parents or grandparents born in Eastern
%' 53
;•/' Europe, or were themselves born there
•'•',': The fact that a majority of South African Jews came from Eastern Europe, or more
V 7/...
-7-
54particularly from the Pale of Russia has important consequences. As has already
been pointed out, to be Jewish in the Pale meant, more often than not, to be poor,
hungry and workless . The lives of Jews in the Pale were characterised by high
mortality rates, tax delinquencies and, of course, high immigration rates as a result
of this. This was as true of I860 as it was of 1920, and although conditions had
changed considerably over this period and many Jews were finding work in the factorie:
that were being established, the conditions of Jewish poverty continued to push
people to emigrate.
The economic conditions were not the only factors in Jewish emigration from Eastern
Europe during this period. Political considerations (which is not to deny an
interaction between politics and economics) played as prominent a role. In the
case of the Jews the pogroms of the 188Ofs in particular played a major part . It
was not very difficult for Jews to see that the pogroms were connected with the
Czarist state and that the fight to defeat anti-semitism in the Russian empire
involved conflict with the Czar. It is for this reason that as a group Jews in
Eastern Europe were highly politicised. Jewish socialists such as Paul Axelrod
and Lev Deich were active in the first revolutionary circle to adopt a Marxist
programme. This was the Group for the Emancipation of Labour (Grupe Osvobozhdeniia
Truda) which laid the foundation of the Social Democratic Workers Party . The
General Jewish Workers Union (Bund) in Russia, Poland and Lithuania was founded in
58
18y7, a year before the RSDLP . According to Mendelsohn, the structural position
of Jewish artisans made them amongst the most militant of the working class in the
Russian empire, pioneering the workers circles and the strikes that occurred during
59 . . .
the 1880's . By the beginning of the twentieth century many Jews were prominent
in both local and national communist movements in Eastern Europe. Many of the Jews
who came to South Africa brought with them this experience. Some had, as children,
participated as messengers and distributors of literature, in their local political
groups. Indeed, one of the early chairmen of the JWC had been imprisoned as a
child of 12 for his activities, while another founder member had left Lithuania
in 1926 to escape the Lithuanian police who were seeking her for her Party
activities.
Both the economic and political features of Eastern European Jewry arc reflected in
the nature and structure of the Johannesburg Jewish community following the period
of major immigration noted previously, i.e. in the 193O's. A survey undertaken in
1936 shows the following occupational distribution of Jews in Johannesburg :
8/...
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MAIN OCCUPATIONS
(% refers to all males over 15 years.)
Occupation %_
Plumbers, mechanics, blacksmiths and similar occupations 2.45%
Tailors, Shoemakers, etc 5.62%
Workers in wood and furniture • 2.76%
Transport and Communication , 2.04%
Commerce, finance, insurance 39.31%
Professions 8.38%
Personal service 2.28%
Clerks '.. ... 9.75%
Retired 4.67%
Students over 15 years of age 7.76%
(% refers to all gainfully occupied females.)
Dressmakers, milliners, etc 9.99%
Commerce, finance, insurance 22.17%
Professions 8.95%
Personal service 4.30%
Typists, clerks etc 49.63%
It is difficult to know the proportion of Jewish workers from these figures.
Sonnabend shows that 39.34% of all males over 15 years are engaged in commercial,
financial and insurance occupations. However, what these figures do not reveal
is how many of these were workers in the various enterprises. Indeed the experience
of many a Jewish immigrant includes an initial stint in the 'kaffir1 eating houses
and the concessions stores where working conditions were deplorable involving long
hours at low rates of pay . Already in 1923 the Jewish Socialist Society
attempted to organise a mass meeting of 'All Jewish unrecognised workers, shop
its
65
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assistant  and clerks1 and in a Native Reef Shop Assistants Trade Union is
started.
•In addition we do not know how many of those involved in the tailoring and shoe-
making trades were workers or bosses. Perhaps this distinction at this point in
time is not very important for the social and economic conditions of the Jewish
self-employed were not very different from those of their workers. Accounts of
cultural meetings at the JWC note that workers and their employers would mix very
easily, living very similarly and having the same cultural background. This
situation, it should be noted, is similar to that of Eastern Europe. Mendelsohn
comments that although there was class conflict between worker and employer in the
Pale, it was described, and often dismissed by Jewish Revolutionaries like Martov
and Vladimir Medem as the class struggle of paupers. If Jewish employers were
capitalists, they were very much 'penny capitalists.1
9/...
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In short, while we do not know the exact proportions of the Jewish working class
in Johannesburg, we do know that a certain proportion were engaged in manual labour
and that a significant proportion of these were workers.
A geographical breakdown of the occupational structure of the Jewish community gives
one some interesting additional factors in the formation of a Jewish working class
organisation. According to certain unspecified economic and social criteria,
Sonnabend divides the Jews geographically into 6 groups: 1. Doornfontein, Bertrams
and Jeppe. 2. Mayfair, Braamfontein, Bez. Valley, Hospital Hill and Rossetenville.
3. Yeoville, Berea, Kensington, Belgravia, Bellevue, Orange Grove and Hillbrow.
4, Parktown, Houghton, Observatory, Parkview, Saxonwold. 5. City. 6. Address
unknown. On the basis of this distinction, Sonnabend finds the following
occupational distributions :
Main Occupations: 4 Districts
(% refers to all males over 15 years)
Groups
Occupations _ _T T__ T.7
• • — , I 11 li.1 IV
Plumbers, mechanics etc A.39 2.83 1.A8 .91
Tailors, shoemakers, etc 9.2A 5.2A 3.17 .61
Workers in wood & furniture A.89 2.30 1.52 .61
Transport and communication A.3A 2.72 1.39 .61
ComraeraE, Finance, insurance 32.36 A3.25 A1.A7 39.64
Professions 3.93 5.13 10.9A 17.85
Clerks 7.26 9.11 11.06 6.65
Students over 15 years 9.20 7.6A 9.63 16.64
The table shows that the highest percentage of people engaged in manual labour are
found in Doornfontein, Bertrams and Jeppe (Group One) 9.2A% of the Jewish populatic
of this district are working as tailors and shoemakers or are engaged in the clothi
industry, while 4.39% are plumbers and mechanics and 4.89% are carpenters. Thus,
comments Sonnabend, 'about 20% of the Jews in these parts of the town are engaged
68
in one or another sort of manual labour.1 In addition one has to take into
account those groups involved as workers in Commerce, finance and Insurance and it
is surely not to far fetched to suggest that the majority of the 32.16% of the
Doornfontein, Bertrams and Jeppes inhabitants working in this sector would be
workers. In another table detailing the status of males in the main occupations,
Sonnabend finds that in the category of Commerce, Finance and Insurance 62.23%
of males are working on their own account, while 37.77% are employees. This
table also gives a general indication of the division of Jews into employer/worker
categories by occupation.
10/...
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'$<,* STATUS OF MALES IN
5$ • ' • MAIN OCCUPATIONS.
^ ' Working on
|lfoccupation. own account. Employees.
plumbers, mechanics, etc. 34.78 65.22
jailors, shoemakers, etc. ' 57.47 42.53
porkers in wood and furniture 45.30 54.70
transport and CommunvCation 57.15 42.85
Commerce, Finance, Insurance 62.23 . 37.77
^ r o f es s ions 69.15 30.85
;/-,personal Service 63.05 36.95
J^lerks, etc. 10.15 89.85
HA Given the predominance of working class elements in Doornfontein, Bertrams and
;?;>•.' Jeppes, it is scarcely surprising that we should find this area to be the home
of a militant organisation which, given the economic and political background of
Johannesburg Jew^y, was committed to Socialism. An article in the Labour Zionist,
the organ of the Zionist Socialist Party in South Africa, congratulated its
Doornfontein branch in 1946 for remaining in existence for 3 years, an achievement,
according to the article, because 'Doornfontein has been and still is the stronghold
of Bundists and Communists.1
The Jewish WorkeVs Club in Johannesburg, according to an article in the Proletarishe
Shtime, was fonu^d in 1929. It seems that the idea was mooted at least a year
72
before that an>i certainly by 1928 a group emerged publishing a radical Yiddish
73journal called IVirem Afrika. Dorem Afrika appeared first in July 1928 as a
'literary and social monthly magazine: the organ of the Yiddish literary society1.
According to Gro.^nan the journal set out ' singlehanded to fight and endeavour to
change the outltv>k, beliefs and pattern of the local Jewish community and applied
its efforts to t^at task with a self assurance and vehemence compared with which all
74
previous attempt made in this direction paled into insignificance.1 While not
agreeing that th^re was the need to change the outlook of the Jewish community,
Grosman's quote ,ioes s.erve to illustrate the emergence of a substantially different
social grouping .among Johannesburg Jewry. I shall return to Dorem Afrika at a
later point. A.^  this stage I am concerned with the formation of the JWC.
Some former members of the Club have suggested its origins in a group of landsleit
(countrymen) who, used to meet informally in a flat in Gordon Road, Bertrams. Three
elements attrac^d people to the flat: the fact that all those who went there were
from the same ai';.a »at home', and spoke Yiddish; that fact that Mrs. Saloner, the
^iddishe mama' ,>f the flat always had a cup of tea and a sandwich available,
something not to be scoffed at in those days of poverty; and the fact that one of
11/...
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the few eligible young Jewish girls lived in the flat. All three elements were
to be present in the decision to form the Club.
The JVC remained a Yiddish speaking organisation, committed to the use of Yiddish
as the language of the Jewish masses and to the development of a Yiddish culture.
The conflict between the Yiddishists and those advocating the use of Hebrew as
the language of the Jews is an old one. In the European context it dates back
to at least the 1860's when a clash emerged between orthodox Jewry represented by
the scholars and Rabbi's of the various communities of Eastern Europe in particular
and the bearers of the Haskalah (enlightenment) movement who saw in Hebrew a lever
to bring the Jews out of the medieval ghetto and shtetl into the 'modern' world
of the urban Jewish merchant classes. In a specifically political context the
Bund argued that as Yiddish was the language of the Jewish masses, it had to be
used as the medium of Bundist and socialist propaganda. Hebrew was portrayed as
the language of the Jewish bourgeoisie and their political philosophy, Zionism.
Hence the cultural arena was one of the major scenes of battle between Jewish
workers and Jewish bourgeoisie, and between socialists and Zionists.
Yiddish was the first language of the majority of immigrants to this country in
the period under discussion. Ideological considerations aside therefore, a
common 'Yiddishkeit1 brought the various segments of Johannesburg Jewry together.
The JWC published all its literature in Yiddish. It established a Yiddish theatre
section and had a very impressive Yiddish choir, often brought out on Mayday to
sing at various labour functions and even heard singing the Red Flag in Yiddish
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on the S.A.B.C. in A typical advert in the Forward announces
a Chu Chu Tlulu (Satirical, Humanistic and Satirical) evening at 44 Von Brandis
79Street (the club's premises at the time).
The social environment and function of the Club should not be underestimated.
80
Although at its height there were only 300 paid up members , its influence
extended to a far larger number of people and to all sections of the Jewish
immigrant population because it was this hive of social activity. Ping pong
was played every evening, chess was a nightly activity, there was a debating
society, the theatre and choral groups already mentioned and a gymnastics club
run by a Mr. Itzler. The Forward of May 19, 1933 announces a 'great proletarian
masked ball' organised by the JWC, to be held at the Selborne Hall on Saturday
May 27th. 'Collective Masks1 says the announcement 'will be introduced for the
first time in Johannesburg.1 In addition socials and picnics were often held,
C]
a favourite date for JWC picnics being May day and Yom Kippur
12/...
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. Thus the social functions of the Club were of extreme importance. They contributed
to its large appeal amongst a certain group of Jews in Johannesburg. Jews came
to a place where they didn't need to struggle with the language, where they could
find companionship and often a husband or a wife; they could express their cultural
needs in the drama or choral groups, or they could merely sit around, drink coffee,
argue local and international politics of wander up the road with a crowd of friends
to get some ice cream at the American Ice Cream Company in Beit Street. They would
also be able to find out what was happening in South Africa and the world (or perhaps
82
more particularly their world) for a wall newspaper was set up and the JWC had
as a particular function the distribution of socialist Yiddish papers such as
83
Der Hammer and Morgen Vryheid, both emanating from the U.S.A.
These cultural activiti.es, however, had very important political implications.
Not only were they seen as expressing proletarian culture, but also as a means
of mobilising the Jewish street in the fight against capitalism. 'Cultural
enlightment work has been placed on a clear class line after the clearing of
the field of petty bourgeois elements, linking lectures (and piays, author)
with topical political phenomenon of the local and international revolutionary
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struggle of the proletariat.1 , The use of Yiddish culture in this perspective
is seen as a weapon in the struggle against the 'Jewish bourgeoisie, the Zionists
and the nationalists of all sorts.1 This discussion will be taken up at a
later point with reference to the African Gezerd. .
One of the chief objects of attack is the philosophy of Zionism, not only in its
cultural aspects (seen in the use of Hebrew and the need for secular education)
but also in its political dimensions. Thus Yiddishists and Socialists could form an
alliance in an attack on Zionism. Commenting on an article in Dorem Africa entitled
'Dr. Landau's Pessimism* Grosman shows that this group of Yiddishists saw Zionism
as a threat to Yiddish culture. 'In no other country... was the Zionist element
and particularly its leadership as estranged from the masses of the people as they
were in South Africa. They ruled the movement in a fascist spirit which even
Moussolini could envy. They taught that the Jewish people had existed once upon
a time, thousands of years ago, and would continue to exist again in some distant
future some centuries hence. What constituted the 'Jewish People' of the present
time was merely a 'Diaspora-mass' whose only duty was to support Zionist funds.
These were the teachings of local Zionist to the Youth. No present existed;
no other language than Hebrew (which the young people did not know) played any
role in Jewish life.'
13/...
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This line of attack is extended by the JWC. Zionism is not merely a denial of
Yiddish culture, but is seen as a tool in the hands of Jewish capitalists. An
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article in the Proletarishe Shtime entitled 'Palestine in the News again1
begins by stating 'South Africa has always been regarded by the World Zionist
Organisation as one of the most important sources of millions of pounds for the
Zionist adventure.1 The editorial of Vol. 1 ,no. 1 of the P.S. states: 'Even
the non-entity on the Jewish street, which calls itself the Yiddish Press bends
over backwards to prove that it serves its capitalist land loyally. It coaxes
the reader into the Zionist dream as well as calling the reader to blindly obey
go
God and his earthly representatives.1 Another article on the 18th Zionist
Congress in Prague connects Zionism with British imperialism in Palestine and
argues that the Jewish bourgeoisie has formed an alliance with its British
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counterpart in an attack on Arab workers and peasants.
The basis of the JWC's anti Zionist position lies in its denial of the possibility
of a solution to anti-semitism under the capitalist order. A 'Declaration and
Platform of the Jewish Workers Club1 written in 1947 states this view explicitly:
'The war has proved clearly that the problems of men and nations
and their desire for freedom and a full life can not be attained
within the framework of the capitalist system, a system built on
exploitation and oppressiun of the great majority by a minority.,
for this reason:
1. the JWC considers that only socialism is capable of finally
folving the economic, social and national-political problems of
men and nations.
2. In those countries which have not yet attained Socialism,
the security of Jewish life and living possibilities are closely
dependent on the growth of freedom and democracy.
3. In contradiction to the views of political Zionism, that the
Jewish problem can only be solved by the establishment of a Jewish
State in Palestine, the JWC therefore maintains that the Jewish
problem CAN'AND WILL be solved in the countries in which the Jews
live.'
The memo goes on to state the Club's position with regard to Israel:
'Politically Zionism, with its watchword of a Jewish State, is
opportunistic, relies on the ruling Imperialism, does not aim
at an independent Palestine, and is basically directed against
the interests of both the Jewish and Arab masses. The same
applies to the Arab reactionary chauvinistic leadership which
aims at maintaining the feudal rule over the Arab masses.'
-14- . .
f$f The socialist alternative to Zionism took two fzTzs. In the first place Jewish
$?i workers in South Africa were to be involved in tha workers struggle in this country.
J'-%j In the main this meant acting as a support organisation to various left wing groups
$$ such as the Communist Party, the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Left Book Club,
pjd Ickaka Laba Sebenzi, (a workers defence organiser ion) as well as taking part in the
$fcj$ anti-fascist struggle which took place in South i-frica during the 1930*s. (These
%| aspects will be dealt with later in the paper) .
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•^ In the second place an anti-Zionist stand mean: attacking Zionists in South Africa
•0 on the one hand, while supporting the establishment of Biro-bidjan as the autonomous
;*;>>*! go
Region for the Jews within the U.S.S.R.
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$&j The African Gezerd, founded in 1932, was the instrument of the anti-Zionist cause
4$ in South Africa. It provided the last major Jevish opposition to Zionism in this
>l$ country. By the time of i t s f irst National Convention in January 1933 i t boasted
f$ij 1200 active members and 'many sympathisers a l l ever the country.1 Throughout
^ 1933 and 1934 the columns of Forward report weekly activities organised by the
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^ Gezerd. Socials and picnics are arranged while numerous meetings are held to
^ discuss, publicise and canvass moral and financial support for Biro bidjan. The
$t$s 96
•jp following report in the Forward is typical of the Gezerd events.
|$] "A meeting of the African Gezerd in the Cape Town Banqueting
&&J Hall was 'filled to capacity to celebrate the founding of
$1 Birbidjan. The meeting was presided over Mr. J. Meirowitz
,'i/j- and rperesentatives of the Workers International Red Aid and
';^  the Communist Party delivered congratulatory speeches. Mr.
£'?; E* Weinberg discussed the reaction of Zionism to the formation
'y'i/i. of the All Jewish Republic. Zionisn, Mr. Weinberg indicated,
(iV; had failed in its task. It remained to Russia to show them
v(y the way.'
'?£• I have not come across any reports of Gezerd activity after 1934. The concern of
;>; most left wing organisations in South Africa seen to turn after that date to the
(i'Ji anti-fascist struggle both in Europe and in this country. I am therefore not sure
:/•' when the Gezerd died, nor the specific reasons why. Its importance for the purposes
.;;;j of this paper lie in the fact that it represented an important alternative to Zionism
;•;* as the dominant philosophy of the Jews in South Africa. The Gezerd had more wide-
}.:,' spread support than the JWC but one can see the sinilarity of their views on Zionism.
':y; The JWC supported the activities of the Gezerd and seems to have a less public
;•<;! presence during the years that the Gezerd was active. Many of the activities that
,vv;j previously went under the banner of the JWC, the picnics, socials, meetings and
Q lectures were now sponsored by the Gezerd.
ki • is/...
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The Gezerd was seen as a more 'nationalist1 institution than the socialist JWC
by the JVC leadership. It is not pushing the point to far to suggest that the
JWC saw the possibility of attracting support through the activities of the Gezerd.
In a somewhat similar strategy to that of the-Third International as regards the
evolution of socialist society through various stages, Jews in South Africa would
move from a 'nationalist1 position to a 'socialist' one. Certainly it is true
that the Jewish community in South Africa expressed a widely based support for the
Gezerd. Many of them had links with Russie and supported the government which had
overthrown Czarist oppression. They could not but support the attempts by the
Bolsheviks to provide a better life for their kinsmen in Russia. A comment made
by a well known and long established Zionist in Cape Town sums up the attitude of
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many Jews in South Africa at the time.
'How could we be anti-Russian in those days when we knew that
the Bolsheviks had alleviated the Czarist oppression of the Jews.1
In the course of the 1930's the concern for the Jewish community in Russia was
subsumed within the general movement against Hitler and in the more specifically
socialist concern for Russia in her conflict with Germany. Perhaps this is one
of the reasons for the decline of the Gezerd.
The most important activities and contribution of the JWC are, I wish to argue,
its involvement in the struggles and organisation of the left wing movement in
South Africa during the 1930's. As a result a history of the Club falls more
easily and assumes a greater significance as part of the history of working class
organisation than as a part of the history of the Jews in South Africa. The reasc
is simple, and will be expanded upon in the conclusion. Jewish workers were a
transitory phenomenon in this country, while working class conflict is not. To
the extent that Jewish workers played a part in the building up of a movement in
this country, their role has been an important and durable one. Put more
succinctly in the words of a former chairman of the Club: 'There was no future
in the JCW because Jewish workers became Jewish capitalists. Turn your energies
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towards exploring more worthwhile and long lasting organisation.1
The history of the socialist left in South Africa in this period is noteworthy for
three features. In the first place there is an intense involvement and interest
International affairs, particularly as they affected the U.S.S.R. Secondly the
South African Communist Party in particular is wracked (and many would argue wreck
by the internal struggles that occur both over party leadership and over the 'con
i 99line . Expulsions and denunciations were common and many prominent left wingei
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among them S.P. Bunting, E. Roux, S. Sachs and Fanny Klonnerraan, were expelled
from the Party. The third important feature of those years for our purposes is
S« the amazing proliferation of left wing organisations, often manned by the same
^(A people, set up to support the many causes created by the situation in Europe.
tj§ Among these were International Red Aid, The Friends of the Soviet Union, the Left
%& Book Club, Ikaka Laba Sebenzi (a workers Defence organisation) and, in the late
JiV* 30's. a joint committee for the Relief of Spain, a Czechoslovakian Emergency
£$j Committee and a committee supporting the Chinese in their war with Japan.
I
6£> The JWC was active and involved in all of these aspects of the left. A glance at
fJi} a list of their arranged talks and lectures, and of the issues raised in the
&J*; Proletarishe Shtiine confirms their international outlook. . An article in Forward
$$ of May 19th, 1933 announces a series of lectures at the JWC every Tuesday night.
v/i>; Lectures include those by M.L. Leitman on 'The Modern Jewish Literature in Soviet
$$ Russia' and S. Edwards on 'The anti-Soviet Bloc...1 On June 23rd 1933 there is
'f$ a lecture on "The Present Immigration in Palestine." In October 1934 we find a
0, lecture by Comrade Nikin on 'Fascism and Fusion' and in February 1935 the JWC
|);| holds a mass meeting 'in connection with the trial of Comrade Rakos, Peoples
$.2 Commissar, Hungarian Soviet, 1919 f. The speakers were W.H. Andrews, J..M. Gibson
|'i and E. Roux. In 1936 a mass meeting to discuss the Spanish situation, is held
|;^  at the JWC with Basner, Edwards and I. Trapido as speakers. In 1939 we find the
$!> Club still active as a venue for debates, films and public meetings.
'% The articles in the Proletarishe Shtime over its life span from May 1932 - November
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'$••$; 1933, reveal a similar concern. The ditorial of the first issue begins:
\fw*j 'For the first time in the history of South Africa we proceed
V.;'i to issue a serious revolutionary organ in Yiddish. It is
'A unneccesary to mention the need for such a forum which should
vi?| reflect the life and struggle of the local proletariat and to
'•???; inform it of the heroic battles and tasks of the fighting
ffi international army.'
'.•'}'•'' '
"•H'j The issue also contains articles on the Second Five Year Plan of the U.S.S.R. and
-,>'i an article by Gina Medem, who spent 18 months in South Africa helping to organise
i-'v the Gezerd. The article is entitled From Shepetovka to Manchuria. Vol 1,
;,•,' Nos. 5-6 is concerned mainly with the October Revolution of 1917. The editorial
'%") of this issue ends in a tone which is characteristic of the journals of the period,
i-^'f. and also indicates its international perspective. The editorial ends:
i'/V; 'Under the leadership of the Communist International, the Communist
£$ Parties of all lands will utilise the anniversary of the Great
fe • 17/...
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October Revolution to mobilise the mass in the struggle:
against the Capitalist offensive
against Fascism and Reaction
against the incipient imperialist war
and against intervention in Russia and China
for the destruction of the might of the bourgeosie in
the whole world
for the dictatorship of the proletariat.
This is not to say that the JWC was uninvolved in local issues. Indeed the articles
on local issues in the Proletarishe Shtime of 1932 outnumber those on international
issues. The first issue of the P.S. has an article by D. Walton, then chairman of
'] the S.A.C.P. on 'The African Proletariat and the National Movement.' This is
followed by S.A. Rochlin's contribution on !The first echoes of class struggle among
South African Natives', an article which starts:
!In the present fighting times, when the International
workers movement witnesses the agony of rotten capitalist
system, it is necessary to logically consider and clearly
formulate the place and the function of the indigenous
proletariat in the international struggle for economic
freedom and political justice.'
He goes on to trace the origins of class conflict to 1837-40 in the period when
'chiefs like Sandile, Makama and Tiyale conducted a war against the European
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settlers in the Cape Colony.
This concern with indigenous class struggle dovetails with a series of lectures by
E. Weinberg on 'The History of the Bantu Tribes in South Africa. The lecture on
Friday May 19th, 1933, was on 'Zimbabwe Culture1 . An article by J.M. Sherman
1
 In the footsteps of spilled workers blood - historical episodes of 1913' is found
•j in Vol. 1, No. 3, while Lazar Bach, a prominent C.P. member has an article on
'The Reformist Unions and the African Trade Unions' in Vol. 1, No. 4, October 1932.
We see therefore that the Club is involved in educating its members on both local and
international issues,and discussing strategy statements about those issues.
The JWC seems to have been involved directly in the internal organisation and
struggles that characterised the C.P. between 1928 and 1935. At the outset we see
that the JWC and the CP have a number of informal links. A number of JWC members
are at the same time members of the CP. The CP used the various premises of the
JWC to hold party functions and meetings. A particularly important function that
the JWC performed was its social one. It was one of the few places where party
18/...
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|Smembers, members of a l l lef t wing groups, and more importantly, members of different
Wit ' . •
'•fefcrace groups, could meet at a social level- Dances, lectures, picnics, plays were
• \&3 •
reintegrated affairs and one informant went so far as to say that the JWC was ahead of
'• ''i'i. '
v'^ jthe Party in this respect. It should also be noted that this social integration
Hftwas in accord with the political line of the JWC which saw the working class of South
^Africa as consisting of both black and white segments.
® A n indication of the integration of the J.W.C. into the left wing movement of the time
iv'1 is given by the greetings extended on the third anniversary of the Club's establishment.
f:'vJ.B. Marks sent greetings on behalf of the S.A. CP. Edward Mofutsanyana representing
'0 the African Federation of Trade Unions, Joyce Mofutsanyana on behalf of the International
'|U Labour Defence, Willie Kalk for the Leather Workers Union and H. Basner for the Friends
;i-'. of the Soviet Union. In addition the Central Committee of the African Gezerd and
#$» the various sections of the J.W.C. which at that time were the Activist Brigade (concerned
**V> with pickets, and the distribution of leaflets), the Drama and Choir section, the
5^ Cultural Committee, the Physical Culture Committee, the General Planning Committee
*.$( and the Publishing Committee.
-;?.:•:
Win addition we see that many of the writings of Communist Party Officials (Bach, Roux,
#$ • . 109
^1 Waiton) were translated into Yiddish and published in the Proletarishe Shtime. The
<%$
I^ 'JWC allied itself with the policies of the Third International, publishing attacks
"in- • T i n
f.&on the Second International, and at a later point denouncing the Fourth International.
'%
£& Fourth Internationalists at that time like Fanny Klennerraan and Max Gordon are still
;'}• treated with scorn by the former Club members.
;.•'•;« A particular function of the JWC was the use of the activist section to both break-up
(A;and protect meetings. In his biography of Bunting, Roux describes how the members of
i';' the Club were used to break up a meeting which Bunting had arranged among his supporters
^ to consider what steps should be taken to revoke the expulsions of himself, Malkinson,
:•$ Weinbren, Tyler and Sachs. The C.P. decided to hold a meeting of the Labour Defence
f^j Organisation in the same hall at the same time. According to PvOux, Lazar Bach, himself
H''a newly1 arrived Lithuanian immigrant and a member of the Political Bureau, undertook
•}u to provide an audience from the members of the JWC. This audience started a fight
>:;.;' with the Buntingites at the meeting and the meeting was closed.
'. ' • > •
,;;••. The Jewish Workers Club also provided the defence for J.B. Marks when he stood as the
'M candidate for Parliament in the Germiston by-election in 1932. Roux's description of
•;V; the meeting gives an indication of the fervour and jollity of politics in those days:
• • ' : • ; • >
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'On that day (October 16, 1932) we set out early. It was a lovely
morning with the brilliant sunshine and a clear sky of the high
veld spring. A sympathizer has provided a motor lorry and on to
this we piled speakers, interpreters, an assortment of stalwarts
from the Jewish Workers Club and girls in their bright cotton
frocks. On the way we laid our plans. Our supporters were to
stand in close ranks around our platform facing the audience and
were not to leave their places whatever in the way of disturbance
might develop among the crowd. In retrospect there seems something
of quite splendid absurdity in our journey that morning, some thirty
young dreamers, setting forth to defeat the.oppressors of the
toiling masses.'
The Jewish Workers Club was also active in the violent struggles of the anti-fascist
campaign in South Africa during the 1930's. Stories of the fights on the city hall
steps are a part of the repertoireof any member of the JWC. They even set up their
own first aid station in the offices of Dr. M. Joffe (who advertises reduced rates
113for medical services rendered to members of the JWC in the Proletarishs Shtime.
According to one interview, Jewish Workers would be beaten up on the city hall
steps, be taken up to Dr. Joffe1s rooms which were just opposite in 6 Barbican
Buildings, cnr. Rissik and President Streets, and then rush down to re-enter the
fray. These personal reminiscences are born out by a report in the Forward of
the attempt to break up a mass meeting of the Relief Committee for the Victims of
German Fascism. Stewards sent by the Mine Workers Union, the Furniture Workers
Union, the Leather Workers Union, the Reef Shop Assistants Union, the Garment
Workers Union and the Jewish Workers Club '...made them (the fascist supporters)
realise that they were not in Berlin fighting defenceless workers and Jews but
were in Johannesburg where they were liable to receive the medicine which they
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were intending to administer.1
The support for the Communist Party is manifest in the fact that the CP felt that
it could hold a meeting to explain the 1935 expulsions of Solly Sachs, Issy Diamond,
Eddie Roux and Spilkin, on the premises of the J.W.C. A report in the Trotskyite
paper, the Workers Voice, discusses a meeting at the J.W. Hall (sic) on ^9th October
1935. At this meeting a 'running battle1 over the 'correct party line1 as regards
the Native Republic slogan developed between Basner and Roux. The choice of venue
for this meeting, and for the launching of the attack on Roux indicates the support
that the C.P. felt it had in its ongoing ideological struggle amongst the members of
the J.W.C. in this period. The J.W.C. was thus an integral part of this fight, a
fight which dominated and emasculated the Communist Party during the period.
The third and final theme to be discussed in this paper is the nature and extend of
the activities of the J.W.C, in their own right, as a contribution to left wing
organisation in the period under discussion. In discussing this theme one must
20/...
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never lose sight of the fact that the club was a Jewish organisation, started and
run by Jewish immigrants of Lithuanian origin. All its activities reveal this
characteristic. Its concern with international affairs reflect its origins and
immigrant nature. The i!ate of their original Jewish communities in Eastern
Europe at the hands of the Nazis show that this concern was only too well founded.
Secondly, its activities here reveal its origins as a 'homeboy' group. Social
functions were a result of Yiddish-speaking people having no where else to go.
One of its early functions was to organise English classes for Yiddish speakers
which Fanny Klennerman, later to be considered a Trotskyite deviant, ran.
Another initial function of the JWC was to organise the collection of money for
political prisoners in Lithuania and Poland. One of the members, in jail in
Lithuania for political activities in his early teens, described how he got foot
and clothes from sympathisers outside. His experience was parallelled by a
number of people in the JWC and it is therefore understandable that they wished to
use the comparatively wealthy status to send money back for political prisoners.
To this end a Gesellschacft Ise Helfen Politische Arresteerde in Liet and Latland
118
was established. I do not have any further information about this organisation
This particular activity emerges again in 1931 when Ikaka Labasebenzi (The Workers
labc
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119Shield), a our defence organisation was started in that year with the support
of the JWC.
Perhaps the most enduring activity of the JWC is its education effort, education here
seen in its broadest meaning. In addition to the propaganda, plays and cultural •
activities, as well as the night school already mentioned, there was a serious and
sustained effort at political education. Speakers such as E. Roux, W.H. Andrews,
A.Z. Berman, S. Buirski, E. Weinberg, and H. Basner gave lectures on the Tolpuddle
121 122 . 123
Martyrs, the Situation in Germany , on Fusion and Exemption from Pass Laws,
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on the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R., and on the Fascist War in Abbysmia from
125
a politico-economic view point. Marxist theory and practice was also important.
On the 16th July 1935 Basner gave a lecture on Trotskyism, while on 19th July I
1 ")f\
Woolfson led a discussion on a recent strike in the Textile industry.
E. Mofutsanyana lectured on 'Three Internationals with specific reference to the
127
so-called Fourth International1 and he later gave a lecture on the situation
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of the Communist Party of South Africa. Marxist political economy was discussed
129in lectures such as 'An Introduction to elementary Political Economy' by I. Lewis.
The reasoning behind the programme is made quite clear in Levenberg's already quoted
article. 'Our lectures were formerly given on general or scientific problems as well
21/...
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as on thetne relating to Eastern Europe. Later however, the main weight shifted to
lectures acquainting members with the life and struggle of the indigenous Black,
Boer and English workers against imperialist enslavement. The JWC also conducts a
fierce (ideological-author) struggle against Zionism, national chauvinism and social
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fascism in the Jewish sphere. Levenberg goes on to note that "...the attendance
at lectures and discussions is not steady, is numerically small and not in accord
with our actual membership".
This statement reveals a number of things. Firstly that the Club consisted of a
small group of political activists who maintained close links with the CP and who
were actively involved in political struggle on both local and international fronts.
Secondly, that a large number of JWC members came because of the activities offered
nightly by the Club. This was recognised by the leadership who saw the Club as a
means of recruiting members 'on the Jewish Street1 through cultural and social
activity into political activity. This assessment was based on the fact that at
this historical point there was a significant and relatively large Jewish working
class with a background of political consciousness. As we shall see, it is the
decline in the working class element among Jewry that contributes to the failure,
and demise, of the JWC. .
The educational activity of the JWC reveals a feature of left wing organisation and
activity since at least 1917, but probably well before that. Educational activity
in the form of classes of topical lectures and the establishment of reading centres
and libraries, are a constant feature of radical organisation. Undertaken at
different times by different groups, lectures, topics and sometimes within a person1:
lifespan, even speakers are similar. Between 1917 and 1919 the JSB of the ISL is
very prominent, and indeed dominant in Johannesburg in the organisation of propagand
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and education. In 1917 the JSB opens up a library and reading room in the
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Palmerstone Hotel. Between 1922 and 1923 the Young Communist League seems to
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take over the activities of the JSB m the educational field. By 1931 the JWC
becomes the most reported educational group, and in 1933 the African Gezerd seems
to undertake most educational activity. In 1934 the Friends of the Soviet Union,
focussing on a different educational aspect, i.e. more directly concerned with the
German/Russian conflict, becomes prominent, while the late rO's is dominated by
educational activities sponsored by the Left Book Club.
While not advocating this as a firm conclusion at this stage, it does seem as though
the nature of radical organisations is such (perhaps this is true of all organisatic
demand a formal education and propaganda apparatus. This was, as has been pointed
out, undertaken by different groups at different times in South Africa but all
22/...
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contribu-ted to the building up of a left wing movement in tHis country. The JWC
merits special mention in this respect.
In keeping with the example set by their predecessors of the JSB, the Jews of the
JWC continued to help raise money for various organisations and causes. In October
toe
In 1934 a meeting is held at the house of a member of the JWC to collect funds for
1 3fi
a' case against E. Roux who was being tried for incitement. Roux himself testifies
that members of the JWC engaged his wife for English lessons in the deliberate
• 137
effort to support the Roux family in times of financial hardship. Numerous
members testified that they collected money for International Red Aid, and for
various campaigns such as the Kubishev appeal, launched to help the Russian War
effort in . The members of the JWC were also involved in the launching
of a 'S.A. Foodship for Spain1, sponsored by the Johannesburg Committee of the
138
Friends of the Spanish Republic.
The 1930's reveals an amazing capacity for people on the left to set up organisations
in support of the various causes. In addition to the Friends of the Spanish
Republic noted above (and it should be noted that a JWC member, Jack Fiior, a
furniture worker, was one of the few South Africans to fight in Spain as part of the
International Brigade ) , there is the emergence of the Friends of the Soviet Union,
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the Left Book Club , the Co-ordinating Committee on Czechoslovakia, the League for
the Maintenance of Democracy, the South African anti-Fascist Movement, the Independent
Cultural Society, the Youth Peace Council, the League of Nations Union, the Youth
League of South Africa and the Workers
the activities of many of these groups.
142
 Liberty Movement. The JWC participated in
The JWC seems to have been particularly active in the anti-Fascist struggle both on
a local and an international level. By 1933 the JWC is participating in anti-Nazi
and anti-war activity.. Together with delegates from the Transvaal Leatherworkers
Union, the Garment Workers Union, the South African Labour Defence League, the
African Gezerd and the Johannesburg Unemployed Councils the JWC was present at a
'United Front Anti-war Conference of Trade Unions and Fraternal Organisations.1
143
A motion passed at this meeting read:
'That this conference of delegates from the trade unions and the
mass organisations protests strongly against the brutal suppres-
sion of the revolutionary movement and mass assassinations of
workers and Jews in Germany.1
The perception of Fascism as a class phenomenon is made clear at a speech made by
Mr. N. Salmon at a meeting of the African Gezerd in the Alhambra Theatre in Doornfon-
.. . 144tern.
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'We cannot accept anti-semitism as an isolated fact in the life
of the nation, independent of the general economy of the people,
but, and especially in its present acute form, view it as a result
of a deliberate policy adopted by a dying capitalism in its last and
desperate struggle to maintain its stranglehold over the working
class.1
145
The speaker goes on to unmask the class conflict inherent in the Jewish Identity:
'Under the cover of non-interference in the inner affairs of a
foreign country, the Jewish bourgeoisie has little to say against
Hitler1s fascism if he would only leave the Jews alone, but the
Jewish masses, the Jewish toilers and small traders ought to be
warned from being isolated in their struggle for their rights.
It is only with the help of the German working class that Jewish
safety will be regained and therefore it is in our own interest
to support the German workers and encourage them in their des-
perate struggle.1
. • ' •
Similar sentiments are expressed at a National Conference against Fascism and War at
which the JWC was present in 1935. According to Forward, 30,000 people were represen-
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ted at the meeting. A meeting organised by the JWC to condemn fascism in South
Africa resolves to !pledge ourselves to assist in organising a mass movement of the
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workers for the purpose of destroying the Fascist movement of South Africa.
It should be remembered that the activities of the left during the 1930's contained a
great deal of support that was anti-Nazi and pro-Russia. Much of the support for
Russia was both because it was a potential ally in the anti-Nazi movement and because
the Bolshevik government had alleviated anti-semitism in Russia. Thus trade union
groups, members of the business community, the Jewish Board Deputies, the Jewish
Workers Club and members of the clergy could quite happily associate with each other
in an anti-Nazi stance. Even those Jews who did not subscribe to the socialist views
of the JWC could participate in anti-fascist activities and their various appeals for
Red Aid. At that stage links with Russia were stronger than they are today and some
Jews worked for the African Russian Oil Products Company. The nature of Jewish suppoi
for the JWC was shown when the Club suddenly switched its line on Germany, following
the Russian German Pact of 1939. Many Jewish workers left the JWC and many Jews
joined up to fight against Hitler. It was not until Hitler attacked Russia and the
CP/JWC line changed that the JWC (or the CP) was able to regain some of its lost suppo^
on this issue.
The Jewish communities fears of anti-semitism declined over a period after the war.
In addition many of their links with Eastern Europe had been cut by the holocaust, her..
the personal attachment to Russia died. At the same time stories of anti-semitism
24/...
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n Russia began to emerge. A former chairman of the JWC told*me that at first he
^wouldn't believe the stories but, as, according to him, they became 'obviously true1,
Hi . . .
v'V(he gradually became disenchanted with the socialist solution to the Jewish problem and
Jft'i turned to Zionism. This view was expressed by a number of the members of the JWCI interviewed although some stated that vidence had not shown Zionism to contain
M-Jthe answer either.
M
%3h final activity that needs to be considered here is the actual involvement of the
•:'^
5
'JWC and some of its prominent members in worker organisation in South Africa. Although
^there doesn't seem to be any evidence of a decision to get involved in trade union
•j£&organisation, or the CP, there is evidence of some involvement in both of these.
,<.'; There were obvious links with the Communist Party. These have already been discussed.
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£ii£ Certainly the Leadership of the JWC saw itself as a mass organisation, closely linked
V ^ to the activities and aims of the CP. It would also seem that many ordinary members,
••*$) impelled by their history in the left wing movements in Russia, Lithuania and Latvia
>V:;V'| felt similarly about the CP. Many participants, however, were neither aware of the
'.;£;•$ line, nor felt particularly strongly for it, but came to be with landleit for a
wjjfe pleasant evening and often to be anti-Nazi and in a general way pro-Russian.
$$4 were also links with those trades in which Jews were prominent workers. Although
;$•!*.; Solly Sachs was regarded as a renegade by the JWC, the Club did interest itself at
f?$\i\ times in the affairs of the Garment Workers Union where there were a significant number
l;V" of Jewish Workers. On 28th March 1930 a public trial held under the auspices of the
'^ !; JWC was held. 'The occasion for the event1 reported the Forward 'has been found in the
'
:Sv'1' widespread story to the effect that the Garment Workers Union (Tvl) was instrumental in
Y'v- inducing the Union Government to pass the quota bill.
<:'-f".\
•'',- •, i
.<"-iv\ Through personalities like Willy Kalk of the Leatherworkers Union, Issy Hayman and
'•'•^V? M.L. Leitman of the Reef Native Trade Shop Assistants Union, Jack Flior and B.
(':•.'; Levenberg of the Furniture Workers Union, Issy Galvin of the Hairdressers Union, Sidney
•£..;•'» Marks and Issy Glazer of the Bakers Union, and Mrs. Grund and Ray Harmel of the Garment
•
J ? ,'"•'.'
',-&.[•> Workers Union, the JWC had some contact and influence w i t h these groups. At times
V.'.V1* - . 152
:''/>';.i1 the Shop Assistants Union ackno-Jledgada donation from the JWC.
' • . ' * " ' » - * .
•'." A"'"'
',/:'''j'The relationship between the Shop Assistants Union and the JWC reveals and adds to our
••/'•^ knowledge of the social composition of the JWC. One informant suggested that the Shop
/^'.Assistants were a different group to those in the JWC. Only three members of the JWC,
&;:J.'!Schochet, Leitman and Haymen, were apparently members of the Shop Assistants Union. The
•i V .*•
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shop assistants were classified as fpetty bourgeois types', people who were attempting
to work for a while and save sufficient money to open up their own shops in time. The
JWC attempted to organise and influence these people through social functions, dances
and concerts as well as encourage them to come to lectures. Apparently these efforts
met with little success.
Members of the JWC put this failure down to the fact that the shop assistants were of
a different class, that they were an aspirant petty bourgeoisie which had little in
common with a working class. Leaving aside the validity of this analysis, it does
point to the fact that the members of the JWC saw themselves as, and were, manual
workers - artisans and tradesmen.
The connection between the JWC and the organised labour movement noted above do not
mean that these connections played a large part in either the work of the JWC or in
activities of the various unions. It is, however, important to note that these
influences were there and that more particularly they represented particular strategic
and ideological positions which formed the basis of many a struggle within them. The
conflicts over 'reformism1 between Ray Harmel and Solly Sachs in the Garment Workers
Union, or between Yudke Shochet and Beeny Weinbren in the Shop Assistants Union have
still to be documented. In the main they seem to have been over the issues that the
Communist Party argued with non-Communist groups as regards the role of the white worki
class or the nature of support for Russia. The question of the political role of
industrial organisations was also prominent.
It remains to analyse the reasons for the decline and disappearance of the JWC. As
far as I can make out the Club reached its height in the middle 30's, was then active
from about 1935-1945 in the campaigns of other organisations, and died a somewhat
unauspicious death between 1948 and 1950. One of those interviewed has noted that the
financial assets of the Club were not dispensed with until the late 1950*s, with the
money going to the left wing newspaper New Age and "Yiddishe Volkshule.
There are a number of reasons for the demise of the Club. In the first place the
social group that the Club catered for, disappeared. The Jewish community, or more
particularly the immigrant community of Doornfontein became more educated and more
integrated. The need for a Yiddish speaking organisation declined as more and more
1 53Jews became fluent in English and Afrikaans. 'Yiddish, the glue, disappeared1.
In addition the cultural atmosphere and activities of the Yiddish-speaking group
declined. .. The choir and dramatic societies lost their interest for a Jewish community
that was increasingly attracted to Anglo-American films, theatre, songs and culture.
It should be noted that a Yiddish press, and some Yiddish cultural societies still
26/...
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in Johannesburg, but as a shadow of their former selves, and certainly with no
•!$'&political programmes comparable to those that have been discussed. In the long term,
j . 1 5 4iSaron's assessment is correct:
'....in the long run it was the Anglo Jewish pattern which, at any
rate in its externals, prevailed in South Africa, although it under-
went important changes in its spirit and inner content. In other
words, the basic trend was for the 'Russian' Jews to become accultu-
rated to the older English-speaking section. It was a case of
pouring Litvak spirit into the Anglo-Jewish bottles". !
I hope this paper points out, it was not only in its externals that the Jewish community
£;V/A second important trend is that those second generation Jews who were committed to
.^socialism went straight into the S.A.C.P. or a similar socialist organisation. They
l''^ iwere interested in directly political organisations, and not in organisations deflected
fctf&and mediated by cultural activities. Being younger and more acculturated, they were
attracted by the 'Yiddishkeit' of the JWC. Thus no young leadership came into the
?*'••••! ' ice
OT-JWC to continue its organisation.
;^Thirdly the Nationalist victory in 1948 created many fears in the Jewish community. At
'^ that stage the rapproachment between the Jewish community and the Nationalist Party was
t^not as cordial as it is today and the Party in the Transvaal still had a clause forbidding
$?)*?Jewish members. As a result many a bonfire burnt in many a Jewish home, destroying
'N'^ books pamphlets leaflets and probably all the records of the JWC, phlets, .
df
^•Another important reason for the demise of the Club lay in the emergence of accounts of
;-.)'-'ianti-semitisra in Russia, and Eastern Europe as well as the need to find a homeland for
•
:
.v;the Jews of Europe. Israel seemed to be the obvious answer to both these problems.
:!.*'§Under the impetus of the first Arab Israeli War in 19-8, many Club members took the
;,.^ first steps to becoming confirmed Zionists.
•fa'/Finally, one must look to the changed economic status of the Jews as a group. A recent
,/;isurvey of the socio-economic position of South African Jewry, based on the 1970 census
';'J-{ figures found 98.6% of the Jews living in urban areas, with 80% living in the major
^cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Germiston and Durban. In Johannesburg only 1%
•/'':') of Jewry have no education while 55% have a matric, as opposed to 29% of the general
''••' . . 1 5 9
.<•/.'<white population. As regards the occupations structure of the Jewish population,
•£.A Cohen and Dubb found that 'whereas the largest proportion of any Jewish male production
f^ -'jworkers in any city (Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth) was 8% of all economically active
.Cymales, the smallest proportion of males was 31% (Cape Town and Pretoria) ' In a
fi • 27/-"
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comparison of the occupation distribution of Jewish and urban white males for selected
areas and for the country as a whole, they found that 'Jews are over represented in the
professional, administrative and sales categories and grossly under represented in the
blue collar occupations.1 In this connection an interesting discrepancy emerges
between the foreign-born and the local-born Jews. 'Thus with the exception of Pretoria
there are considerably more professionals amongst the local-born Jews than amongst
the foreign-born. Foreign-born Jews are seen to predominate in sales (working
proprietors and salesmen) and to a lesser extent in administrative, managerial and
executive occupations.... There is also a somewhat larger proportion of foreign-born
production workers1 ?..,In fact it may be noted that in virtually all sections of
the economy there is among Jews, both male and female a higher proportion of employers
than in the white population as a whole.1
To put all of this more succintly in the words of one of those interviewed: 'Jewish
Workers have become Jewish Capitalists.1 While it is true that even in the period
under discussion the Jewish working class, seen as productive, blue collar workers, was
not large, it is as true that Jewish employers or self employed men and women could in
most cases not be called rich or capitalists in the sense of owning the means of
production in any significant way. Indeed 'Kafferitnik1 store owners moved quite
easily with their employees at the JWC, as did apprentice tailors with their masters.
If there was class conflict, it was the conflict of paupers.
Again this is not to deny that there were not some major Jewish capitalists. A glance
at the Jewish Yearbooks of 1929 and of 1965 indicate the extent of Jewish owners of
capital, who include among their number Barney Barnoto, Sammy Marks, and the so-called
164 • .
Mielie King E. Lazarus. But these were mainly Jews of British and German origin.
The age of Lithuanian capitalism was yet to come. The description of Jewish poverty
given by B. Sachs in the early years of the century were to be true of the 1930's as
well. It is not until the war years that the Eastern European Jews as a group
move from Doornfontein into Cyrildene, Yeoville and Houghton.
In accounting for the relatively rapid upward occupational mobility of the Jews in
South Africa, Cohen and Dubb set forward a number of propositions advocated in a
number of American studies. These propositions account for the relatively rapid
mobility in terms of (a) the high value which Jews have traditionally placed on
education (b) a moderate non-ascetic worldliness, utilitarianism and empiricism,
sobrietry, sexual morality and group cohesiveness and (c) a long history of urban
experience. Fishman is quoted as stating: "The much touted 'Protestant ethic1
has been found to have been preceeded by the Jewish takhlis (yiddish 'purpose1, 'goal')
28/...
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,168 Cohen and Dubb go on to say: that 'although such explanations must
remain with the realm of speculation, since they refer to past attitudes and
tw.-v'veuts. they do seem to fit the data not only in the American Jewish situation but in
•-'** . 1 6 9
South African too.I
MJhile not denying aspiration values and the desparate attempt to get out of the ghetto
factors in the upward mobility of South African Jewry, it seems to me that the reason
the rise of Jewish capitalists in this country lie far more in the socio-economic
-'"'structure within which Jews as artisans, shop assistants and workers found themselves
i':Vin within this country. A comparison with the structural position of the Jews in
JJ^ Ea stern Europe at the turn of the century illustrates the point.
;;-:',The Pale of settlement was characterised by the fact that in the provinces of Minsk,
'^Vitebsk, Moglieve, Vilna, Grodno and Kovno (i.e. the n.w. region of the then Russian
J.ii*empire) the Jewish element predominated in the urban proletariat. This Jewish
^proletariat, however, was emerging as an industrial proletariat by the 1900's. No
VjJlonger was the Jewish apprentice able to 'dream of independence1 and at the first
^opportunity 'leave his master and open his own shop or become a journeyman1 Martov,
'f.'^ the Jewish Menshevik leader noted that by the 1900's workers in the larger establishments
'jjSsaw that they had little chance of changing their status as workers, while a study of
feVilna carpenters after the 1905 Revolution revealed that the carpenters no longer
$<$'...regard themselves as future employers; they have become permanently hired labourers.
;',Thus the industrialisation process at work in Russia during this period produced
'.^cleavages between Jewish workers and Jewish employers which confirmed the status of
'•"•^ Jewish workers as precisely that. No longer was there any structural possibility of
fc/a mass of Jewish workers becoming Jewish employers, even for a brief period. It was
• •')
V-.'iin this role organised that in the Bund the Jewish proletariat was to play an important
:'* . 173
in the 1905 and the 1917 Revolutions.
v}!;This of course was not the case in South Africa. South Africa, as Cohen and Dubb
',;', *J . 174
'•;:>,:point out in a footnote, did not have the highly differentiated economy which might
• • i'i
>-:have confronted the Jews who emigrated to the United States. Here the underdeveloped
.";': business and finance sectors enabled Jews with iniative to move out of their disadvan-
•' ,. taged immigrant position. In addition many unskilled and semi-skilled jobs were closed
r/"'to Jews, and whites generally, as these would be taken up in the main by Africans,
.'•..Indians or Coloureds. The political and economic conditions which created the white
•v*labour aristocracy served to ensure that Jewish workers, or 'penny capitalists' (to use
•'.;• the title of Sol Tax's book) who also had. the attributes noted by Cohen and Dubb above,
'•'3 29/...
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would escape the position of their fellows in Eastern Europe. Thus Jews were able
to take advantage of the industrialization of South Africa to escape from the shtetl
in one generation, faster perhaps than any similar Jewish immigrant community else-
where in the world. That they are as successful as the figures produced here
show is in part due to the characteristics suggested by Fishman and Cohen and Dubh,
but these are secondary to the structural considerations that have been noted.
By 1970 they are indeed one of the most successful ethnic groups to operate as
capitalists in South Africa, and as such there is no reason to suppose that their
activities as manufacturers, farmers, shop owners and property owners should have
been based on factors any different from those which permitted the general development
of the South African economy, viz a dependence on, amongst other things, a cheap aad
docile labour supply, created in the interests of an expanding capitalist formation.
e
By I960, and perhaps even by 1950, it is indeed possible to agree withyJaron that
'Jews share the attitudes of most (white-author) South Africans. Apart from the
few Jews who have been among the militant supporters of the campaign for non-European
advancement the majority incline to moderate middle of the road policies which avoid
extremes of both the left and of the right.' But to agree with this statement
is to understand why this is so, from a historical perspective, and to recall that
more than a 'few Jews' were at one stage militantly anti-capitalist, and therefore
anti-Zionist. Even if their membership was small, their influence at particular
times in South Africa's history, was widespread, significant and important. It
was important as part of a general struggle, a struggle which, for the JWC, had
its height in the anti-fascist conflicts of the 1930's and the attempts then to
permit black South Africans to participate in the governing of their country in its
economic and political aspects. It is to these struggles, and to this period of
history, that the history of the Jewish Workers Club properly belongs.
T. Adler
University of the Witwatersrand.
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In April 1942, the Prime Minister, General Smuts, decided that
African trade unions should be granted full legal recognition
under the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Act - which had been
introduced, in 1924, by the first Smuts administration - used a
definition of 'employee' which excluded all pass-bearing Africans
(ie. most African men). Under the Act, trade unions composed of
'employees' could be registered, and these registered unions were
provided with access to the various institutions for conflict
resolution established by the Act; African men were generally
excluded from these registered trade unions. The raciai division
of the working class and the subordinate status of African
workers were thereby reinforced and institutionalised. If, in
1942, Africans had been included within the definition of
'employee', the subsequent history of South Africa would have
been very different. However, early In the December of that
year, the cabinet decided not to proceed with a change to the
law, and, indeed, it was not until 1979 that African unions
received legal recognition. Why did Smuts agree to redefine
'employee'? And why did he change his mind? These are the
principal questions which this paper seeks to address.
Hitherto, the most detailed consideration of the recognition
debate was that presented recently by David Duncan.1 However,
Duncan1s focus was a rather narrow one, the state bureaucracy,
and he tended to exaggerate the role of senior civil servants and
to downplay the significance of conflicting class interests end
the pivotal position of Smuts, In an earlier paper on the
subject, Dave Lewis correctly identified this weakness as a form
of 'idealism1.0 However, Lewis did not make use of archival
sources and his own account now looks rather dated. Both Lewis
and Duncan were influenced by a Poulantzasist view of the state
which, although it has some merits, tends to underestimate the
dynamic interplay between the state and wider social forces. I
have sought to avoid this weakness, and hope that the resulting
analysis sheds some new light on the character of the state and
on the politics of different classes in this important period.
Although the main drama of the recognition debate took place
in 1941 and 1944, there was an opening act, which occurred in
between 1938 and 1940, and a finale, which took place between
1945 and 1947. It will be necessary to consider both of these
subsidiary episodes, but especially the former, because positions
which were adopted in this earlier period helped to shape later
events.
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The Departments '
The South African economy experienced rapid expansion in the
period 1933-39, and this was particularly marked in private
manufacturing, where the totai employed increased by 94 percent.
This process continued during the war years, when total
employment in this sector increased by a further 45 percent, to
reach 399, ill. By the time of the 1946 census, there were more
people employed in manufacturing and construction than in mining.
Between 1932-3 and 1944-5, the proportion of Africans employed in
private manufacturing increased from 39 to 52 percent (compared
to a decline in the proportion of whites from 41 percent to 30
percent).3 An important feature of the war years, was the
expansion of semi-skilled employment, owing to mechanisation,
and, although there is no accurate data on this development, it
is safe to assume that an increased proportion of these positions
were held by Africans.
These trends were important for two reasons. First,
alongside the recovery of the economy and the increased size of
the African labour force, there was a growth in the number and
size of African trade unions (most of which were located in
Johannesburg). Secondly, there was an increase in the level of
official concern about the impact of settled African communities
at the heart of South Africa's cities. This was reflected in
various government commissions and in some changes to the law.
From the perspective of this account, the most important change
was the introduction of 1937 Wage Act, which enabled the Wage
Board to make wage determinations covering unskilled workers
(mostly Africans). This, in turn, provided some added scope for
the development of African unions, and brought these unions into
greater contact with the Department of Labour (DL), which was
responsible for administering the Wage Act (as well as the
Industrial Conciliation Act),
In late 1937, Tommy Freestone, a senior officer of the
Department of Labour (DL), reported that there were eight unions
which were known to cater mainly for African workers.* These
unions came to be grouped into two federations: the Joint
Committee of African Trade Unions, whose secretary was Max
Gordon, a white Trotskyist, and the Co-ordinating Committee of
Non-European Trade Unions, with Gana Makebeni, an ex-Communist
Party member, as its general secretary.3 The Joint Committee was
the larger of the two, and, at the end of 1938, the DL1 s
Johannesburg District Inspector, Col. F. L. A. Buchanan, noted
that: 'Mr. Gordon had almost a monopoly of the control Cof
African unions]1.* Freestone, in his report, commented that:
...the officials tof the African unions] stress
the danger of politics within the Unions. The
whole environment, however, is already silently
communistic Communistic posters and pictures and
mottoes are prominent features of these meeting
places. In some instances the Secretary is a
Corrmunist, at least in words, and there is no
doubt that the "silent" propaganda will bear fruit
in t ime, 7
FoLlowing Freestone's report, the Registrar of Trade Unions
drew up a memorandum which concluded: 'The time has arrived to
consider the question of giving a measure of recognition to
native "trade unions", which are springing up in the larger
industrial areas, with a view to exercising a definite degree of
control over them'.0 The question of 'control' became more
pressing as a result of the modus operandi developed by Gordon
and the Joint Committee unions. They 'policed' wage board
agreements and collected arrear wages, either via the DL or
directly from employers. In order to escape prosecution, many
employers preferred to deal directly with the unions (which, for
the workers, was the quicker s^kution>. This led to the District
Inspector's office being by-passed and to the strengthening of
the unions, and Buchanan complained bitterly about Gordon's
'interference1, which he regarded as ' undesirable' .*
In June 1938, Ivan Walker, the Secretary for Labour,
enclosed the Registrar's memorandum in a letter to Douglas Smit,
his opposite number at the Department of Native Affairs (DNA). *°
Walker had roots in the trade union movement, having been General
Secretary of the Typographical Union. During the war, Smuts
appointed him to the powerful position of Controller of Manpower
(whilst retaining him as Secretary for Labour), thereby providing
Walker with direct access to the Prime Minister. Smit, who later
became a United Party MP, was also highly regarded by Smuts. He
was an energetic and able administrator, and, having undertaken
his own enquiries, he came to a similar conclusion to that of the
DL. In his opinion: 'The growth of these organisations is
inevitable and it is wiser from our point of view to recognise
them now rather than that we should be forced to do so later
on1. ''
The DL and the DNA, the two Departments which had direct
contact with African trade unions, both favoured some form of
official recognition. The DNA, however, favoured non-statutory
recognition for African unions, and they felt that they, rather
than the DL, should have the prime responsibility for
administering the recognition procedures. This was probably more
than mere 'empire building'; it was the logic of Hertzog's policy
of segregation. The then Minister of Labour, Harry Lawrence, a
United Party member, sympathised with this policy. In October,
he totd the Annual Convention of the South African Federated
Chamber of Industries (SAFCI) that the government was considering
some form of recognition, arguing that without 'control' there
was a danger of African unions falling into the hands of
'undesirable' organisers. 'The average native', he was reported
as saying, 'did not possess that high degree of responsibility
which trade unionism required1. 'The salvation of the native',
he concluded, 'did not lie along the lines of orthodox trade
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unlonism, but along lines defined for him'by the Native Affairs
Department in consultation with the Department of Labour'.1*
By the end of 1936, the DL and DNA had drawn up a set of
possible rules for the recognition of African unions.13 In order
to obtain recognition an organisation <the word 'union' was
avoided) would have to provide the names of office bearers and
officials, a copy of its constitution, and information about
membership and finances. Recognition could have been withdrawn
if the union had supported strike action or if it had failed to
co-operate with the DL's Divisional Inspectors. This emphasis on
'co-operation' was probably included so as to deal with Gordon's
activities. Finally, only one organisation would have been
regarded as representative of Africans employed in a particular
industry. ' •
African Opinion
A good example of the African Unions' case was the submission
presented, a Iittle later, to Smit' s Interdepartmental Committee,
by Daniel Koza, Secretary of the African Commercial and
Distributive Workers' Union (ACDWU), the Joint Committee's
biggest affiliate. Koza's starting point was the need for
African workers to secure higher wages, an issue which also
concerned the government. He argued that the existing industrial
relations machinery had failed to improve their pay. This
failure had occurred because African workers could not be
directly represented on Industrial Councils, or obtain the
benefits of conciliation and arbitration, or obtain legal
enforcement of agreements made with individual employers. Wage
levels, he said, were higher in those industries where unions
existed, but, he added, because of the legal situation, it was
sometimes necessary to go on strike, and when this happened
workers were needlessly turned into criminals. He added: 'The
fact that African workers have become industrialised, and that
the severed ties with tribalism cannot now be restored goes
without saying, and this new proletariat must be accorded
complete industrial citizenship, so as not to suffer the economic
and social depressions of a changing South Africa1,*3 Thus,
Koza1 s was an appeal, on behalf of the 'new proletariat', which
linked a widespread concern about poverty to the need for
political, or at least industrial, equality. 1 S
At the 1939 Conference of the South African Trades and
Labour Council (SATLC), Makabeni and Gordon joined forces to move
a resolution rejecting 'any attempt to place native trade unions
under jurisdiction or control of the Native Affairs Department'.
Makabeni said that the officials of this department 'adopted very
bullying tactics1 when dealing with African workers. Smit noted:
'the Unions regard the Department as an instrument of oppression
used by the Government for the enforcement of oppressive taws
like the Pass and Native Tax Laws'. 16 The SATLC resolution also
called for 'registration on the same basis as other workers'
organisations1. The great majority of the delegates was white,
but the SATLC had always called for the inclusion of Africans
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under the Industrial Conciliation Act, and the Conference passed
the resolution without dissent. 'T
However, there was a tactical division between the two
groups of African unions. In mid-August 1939, two consultation
meetings were held, involving, besides officials from the two
Departments, Mrs. Ballinger, one of the Africans' parliamentary
representatives, Makabeni and Koza. At the second meeting Mrs.
Ballinger presented a memorandum based, she said, on
consultations with those she represented. It included a call for
recognition under the IC Act, but accepted the idea of a 'half-
way-house', based on an amended version of the rules, which,
among other matters, stated that the main point of contact with
the government should be, as it had been in practice, the DL1s
Divisional Inspectors, not the DNA. 1O It would appear that she
was representing the views of the Co-ordinating Committee, but
not the Joint Committee. Walker was informed that, prior wO the
second of the two meetings, 'Gordon's Union held a meeting and
decided unanimously that they want full statutory recognition'.1'
Following the onset of war and the fall of the Hertzog
administration, Walter Madeley, the Labour Party leader, was
appointed Minister of Labour, and Walker immediately redrafted
the proposed rules so as to incorporate the criticisms made by
Mrs. Ballinger and those she represented.20 Smit seems to have
been happy with the redraft, and, after a brief delay, his new
minister, Deneys Reitz, approved the new rules.21 At this stage
Walker and Smit must have felt confident about the possibilities
of pushing through their proposals for administrative
recognition. There was, however, one problem. ...
Mining Interests
In August 1939, the Chamber of Mines had entered the fray with a
blunt but powerful letter to the Director of Native Labour. They
opposed the proposed rules, even though they excluded the mines.
They were concerned that recognition would stimulate the growth
of African unions generally, and that the mines would eventually
be affected. They also argued that, 'the Native is not yet
sufficiently advanced to control and manage ... a labour union',
and that, therefore, such unions 'would inevitably fall into the
hands of the European communistic movement'. Their alternative
was simple:
The Mining Industry has had experience of Native
trade unions through the activities of the
Industrial Commercial Workers' Union ... The aims
of this organisation were extreme, with a marked
tendency towards strikes, which, in the Native
mind, connote "war" and are therefore nearly
always accompanied by violence and bloodshed. The
policy adopted by the Mining Industry towards the
l.C.U. was non-recognition and determined
opposition. In a year or two the large membership
of this formidable body dwindled to negligible
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proportions, and the Unions ceased to be an
influence amongst Native mine workers.22
As a result of this intervention, Hertzog's cabinet had
decided not to proceed with the proposed ruLes. Then, in 1940,
when the new Smuts administration came to reconsider the matter,
they were met with forceful opposition from the Department of
Mines. In a letter to Walker, the Secretary for Mines enclosed a
restatement of the Chamber's position, and he added a further
argument of his own:
The Witwatersrand is a low grade goldfield, and in
order to ensure the continuance of operations for
the longer period, it is in the interest of the
State that mining costs should be kept as low as
possible. In the event of the native labour
employed by the mining industry becoming organised
on Trade Union lines, a probable result would be a
substantial increase in wages, which would ...
shorten the period during which mining could
economically be continued.23
The DL and the DNA had co-operated in producing moderate
proposals for the recognition and control of African unions.
They had secured the support of some of the African unions and
the Africans' parliamentary representatives, and also the SATLC.
But they were blocked by the power of mining capital. Smit was
quite definite about this: 'As a result of objections raised by
the Chamber of Mines, nothing was done1 . 2 +
The Upsurge
Between mid-1940 and mid-1941, there was a lull in the debate.
This probably reflected a lull in the level of African trade
union activity. Although the cabinet had rejected official
recognition, unofficially the DL and the DNA recognised African
unions by considering their complaints and responding to their
correspondence, and this continued to be the case.
In May 1941, Africans employed at five Johannesburg coal
yards had struck work. Despite the arrest of the strikers (all
366 of them) and despite the use of convicts as scab labour, the
strikers and their union, the ACDWU, won their demand for a wage
increase.25 As a result of the strike, Mrs. Bat linger and
others, who had been involved In bringing about a settlement,
secured a special meeting with Walker and Smit. This meeting,
which was held on 6 June, considered the wider implications of
the dispute, and it resulted in a number of important decisions,
including an agreement that Walker would raise again the matter
of African trade union recognition. This was the origin of
renewed interest in the matter within government circles,26
The circumstances under which the issue was reconsidered, in
1941 and particularly in 1942, were very different to those
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prevailing in 1938-40. To start with, ih'the years 1938, 1939
and 1940 there had been a low level of strike action, but in 1941
and, particularly, in 1942 there was a marked increase in the
level of mi I itancy. Z7 Associated with this rising level of
struggle, there was a rapid growth in the number and membership
of black trade unions. In November 1941, the Joint Committee and
the Co-ordinating Committee merged to form the Council of Non-
European Trade Unions CCNETU). The new body was launched at a
conference attended by 93 delegates from 32 African and
'coloured' unions. It passed a number of resolutions, including
a 'strong request' that the government immediately amend the
definition of the term 'employee'.20 David Gosani, who had
replaced Gordon as Secretary of the Joint Committee, was elected
as Secretary of the new body, and Makabeni was elected as its
President; Koza became an Executive Committee member. An
official of the DNA reported that these three men, 'are able and
intelligent persons and 1 should say the leading lights in the
Native Trade Union movement'. 2 V
Running parallel to these advances in African trade
unionism, there was a modest, but significant, shift to the left
in the ANC. This shift can be dated back to December 1940, when
Dr. A. B. Xuma took over as the ANC1 s President-General.30
Baruch Hirson is very probably correct to argue that the
leadership of the ANC 'had little sympathy with direct working-
class action',31 but Xuma and CNETU did co-operate with each
other, and the ANC did take up the recognition question. In
March 1942, when the Deputy Prime Minister received an ANC
initiated deputation, recognition was on the agenda, and Gosani,
representing CNETU, was a member of the deputation.32 Then, in
July, Xuma informed Madeley that 'all Africans are opposed to any
'halfway house' recognition ... that is, anything short of
recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act'. "
During this period, the ANC developed a closer relationship
with the Natives Representative Council (NRC). Four members of
the NRC joined the March deputation, and Xuma told Smit: 'We are
together. Our case is one. I am their national leader', 34-
Following the 1942 NRC elections, at least seven of the 16 NRC
members identified with the ANC; they included Z. K. Matthews,
who began to function as leader of the NRC caucus.3S In December
1942, the NRC backed a resolution calling for IC Act recognition
for all African unions, including the African Mine Workers'.3*
This continued to be the position of the NRC, and when, in 1946,
the NRC refused to assemble, as a protest against being treated
like a 'toy telephone1, their most urgent demand was for the
recognition of African unions.37
This process of radicalisation was summarised in a long
letter which Smit received from his subordinate, Mr. Lowe, the
Director of Native Labour, in August 1941. The letter provides a
good description of the mood then prevailing among Africans,
particularly on the Rand:
The old reverence of the European has Iong gone by
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the board. It has been replaced by a Bantu
nationalism, founded in a determination to secure
by and for themselves, what they feel European
Authorities have refused to the Natives. ...
It is, however, In the industrial and labour
world that Native activities are becoming so
pronounced and impressive. Native leaders have
learnt the power of organisation and of organised
labour. Native labourers are rapidly being taught
and learning the same thing. The Government's
refusal to give recognition to Native Trade Unions
means nothing. ... A position is created where,
willy nilly, employers have to recognise the
Unions as the only practicable way of preventing
serious stoppage of work. ...
The wholly unsatisfactory economic position
of the Native wage ea. ..er in towns, the stress of
hunger and of malnutrition ... these are the very
conditions to encourage the organisation of
labour . . . 3 O
The 'Great Change1
It is unlikely that Smit would have been surprised or
annoyed by Lowe's remarks. One week earlier he had been
appointed, by the Prime Minister, to chair the Interdepartmental
Committee on Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban
Natives." Two weeks before this event, Smuts had confided that
wage increases for 'non-Europeans and unskilled Europeans are
fully justified', and he had added: '1 am anxious to keep our
workers in good temper'.*0 It was probably an initiative from
Smit, with the authority and experience he had gained from the
Interdepartmental Committee, that very nearly led to the full
recognition of African trade unions.
The final Smit Report, which appeared at the end of 194-2,
recommended, as an ' interim measure1, the immediate
administrative recognition of African trade unions in accordance
with the rules which had already been agreed.*1 However, prior
to this, in January 1942, he produced a memorandum for
ministerial discussion which must have taken the argument a good
deal further, * z because, on 10 April, he informed Walker that:
the Government has undertaken to introduce during
the next Session of Parliament an amendment of the
Industrial Conci I tat ion Act, no. 36 of 1937,
deleting those words in the definition of an
"Employee" which have the effect of excluding
ordinary Native workers from the definition.
The decision had been taken by Smuts, together with Madeley
and Reitz. We cannot be certain about their reasons, but we can
surmise a number of factors: concern about poverty among Africans
and a feeling that the growth of African unions was inevitable
(these were both mentioned in the Smit Report), coupled with a
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desire to exert some control over Africanfunions so as to
discourage 'undesirable' behaviour, such as striking (as
evidenced by departmental memoranda and the minutes of the post-
coal strike meeting). The Mines and Railways and Harbours were
to be excluded from the amendment. Furthermore, according to
Smit, 'The question whether Native Employees are to be
represented on Industrial Councils by natives If they so desire,
or whether It would be more expedient for them to be represented
by Europeans, on the the analogy of their representation in
Parliament, remains open for the present, but should be kept In
view when amendments of the law are under consideration'.*3
Nevertheless, the government had made a definite decision to
introduce recognition under the IC Act.**
Reitz wrote to Madeley informing him that, on behalf of the
government, he had given an assurance to the Africans'
parliamentary representatives, that the government had undertaken
to Introduce, in the next session of parliament, an amendment to
the IC Act, so as to Include Africans within the definition of
'employees',*3 The letter was signed by Reitz, but It would
appear that it was never sent. However, Madeley announced the
government's intention to the press, and this was reported on 28
May. Prior to this, on 12 May, at a meeting of the SATLC
National Executive Committee, he had provided a similar
undertaking to that given by Reitz. According to one report,
Madeley said that:
He had been able to show the Cabinet that the
organising spirit among unskilled workers has
become very great, particularly among Africans,
and It is a matter for gratification that the
Government would now recognise the trade unions
catering for natives. In effect, it would give
all workers the same rights to collective
bargaining under the Act.*6
However, on 22 July, Madeley's private secretary Informed
Gosani: 'the question of the recognition of African Trade Unions
is under consideration of the Cabinet'. * y On 23 October,
Madeley1 s private secretary told Mike Muller, Secretary of the
Pretoria Joint Council of Non-European Trade Unions that: ' in
present circumstances it is very unlikely that such amendment Eto
the IC Act] will be found possible during the next Session of
Parliament'.*0 On 28 November, when Madeley opened the first
annual conference of CNETU (which was claiming 25 affiliated
unions representing 37,000 members), he asked delegates to be
'patient1. 'Many difficulties stood in the way' of recognition,
he said, but he was 'reasonably certain that fruition would
result'.*'5' In early December, Madeley announced that the
Government would not be proceeding with an amendment in the next
session, as previously announced.30
On 19 December, the government announced the promulgation of
War Measure 14-5, which introduced new penalties for Africans who
went on strike. Some writers have argued that this War Measure
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had an important positive aspect: that it'allowed for arbitration
linked to consultation with African unions.31 However, the
measure did not provide the unions with a right to arbitration,
and during 1943 and 1944, the DL only referred six disputes to
the arbitrators. Principally, War Measure 145 was a punitive and
discriminatory measure, which Is why, at the time, it was widely
condemned. Some established trade unionists even described it as
1
 fascist1.5Z In December 1942, African trade union leaders had
hoped for recognition, but the government had responded with
renewed repression.
Explanations
Why had the government moved from a position, in April, of
supporting full recognition in the next session, via a period of
vacillation, to a new position, by early December, of opposing
such recognition? Initially, there was some delay because Reit_,
who was supposed to communicate the April decision to Col.
Stallard, the Minister for Mines, failed to make contact with him
(perhaps because he, Reitz, was unwell). This explains why
Rettz's letter to Madeley, which had been signed, was never
sent.33 Probably, when Stallard heard of the decision he
insisted on a cabinet discussion. However, at this stage, the
arguments against recognition would hove been the old ones put
forward, in particular, by mining interests (in February 1942,
the Chamber had written another letter opposing recognition).3*
It is unlikely that these arguments were decisive. ...
The second half of 1942 witnessed a wave of strike action.
In Durban, these strikes included a major stoppage of African
dock workers and, from 8 December, a strike at the DunI op
factory, which united African and Indian workers. In September,
African miners at the Northfield colliery in Natal set fire to
the company's buildings. In Johannesburg, during September and
October, there was a month long strike In the sweet industry
which involved black and white workers, mainly women. In
December, there were a series of strikes on the Witwatersrand,
mostly associated with a wage determination for unskilled
workers; these included particularly militant strikes involving
dairy and meat workers. Then, on December 28, in Pretoria, there
was a demonstration of municipal workers which was attacked by
troops, and ended with the deaths of 16 Africans and one
white. s*«*
The shift in policy was almost certainly connected with
these strikes. When, on 13 January 1943, Smuts met a deputation
from the Christian Council (which included the Archbishop of Cape
Town), his response to their question about recognition began
with the words: 'Things are inconvenient now; there is a wave of
unrest in this country1. s s Similarly, in March 1943, Madeley
told the Senate: 'the ... increase in native strikes, has created
an unfavourable atmosphere for consideration of the recognition
of native trade unions'.36 When, on 25 January, Madeley met a
deputation of Africans' parliamentary representatives, he said
that he was particularly worried about 'the position in Durban',
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where, he said, 'the Indians and the nattves are working
together, and the prejudice against this combination is growing1.
At the same meeting, Major van der Byl (who had replaced Reitz as
Minister of Native Affairs) said that he 'feared ... that if the
European Trades Unions want something and they have control of
the Natives in their Trades Unions, they might use the whole
force of Native labour to create a strike to gain their [the
Europeans] interests' . S7 It seems most likely that the
government was opposed to conceding recognition at a time when
workers, particularly African workers, were on the offensive. It
would have looked as if they were giving into pressure, and they
would have been worried that this might encourage further
militancy. It is also possible that they were disturbed by the
spectre of workers of different 'races' uniting in action, which
might have become more likely if 'employee' had been redefined.
In Marci. 194-3, Sen. Hyman Basner, one of the Africans'
parliamentary representatives, presented three reasons why 'a
great change1 had come over Madeley. First, 'the unfortunate
experiences on the Rand ... a number of strikes'. Secondly, and
most importantly, 'the European trade unions are beginning to
look on the recognition of the Native trade unions as a threat1.
This was an important suggestion, to which I shall return at some
length. However, between April and December, none of the mainly-
white trade union bodies amended their policies of support for
recognition, and it would seem unlikely that it was a key element
in the 'great change'. Thirdly, 'the Communist elements have
entered into the trade unions to ... an undesirable extent'.50
Here, Basner was echoing remarks made the Prime Minister. At his
meeting with the Christian Council, Smuts had continued his
statement with: 'Communistic influence is at work in our land on
a fairly large scale1. Smuts may have thought that the anti-
Communist argument would have been particularly appealing to
Christian leaders, but if so he was wrong. Soon after, the
Council, on the Archbishop's recommendation, carried a resolution
calling for recognition of African unions by an immediate change
in the law. "
Whilst the Communist Party did support strikes once they
occurred, they tended to use their influence to discourage such
action. For instance, in December 1942, Michael Harmel,
Secretary of the Party's Johannesburg District Committee, told
readers of The Star: 'My party is strongly in favour of a policy
of avoiding stoppages of work ... as being prejudicial both to
the workers' just demands for higher wages and to the higher aim
of securing victory in the war . . . '.*° There was a growth in
support for the Party amongst African workers, but this was a
product of the new mood of assertiveness, not its cause. It is
likely, however, that Smuts was working with a broader definition
of 'communist' implied by the term 'communistic', and closely
associated with 'undesirable'. if so, according to Smuts, anyone
identified with supporting strike action should be regarded as a
'communist1, and the unrest was, by definition, 'communistic';
but then we are left with the first explanation as the main cause
of the change in direction. Consciously or unconsciously, Smuts
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used a fear of communism to justify the hew, repressive policy;
but it was a justification rather than an explanation.
Dunbar Moodie has pointed to the importance of the ideology
of ant I-Communism In the suppression of the 1946 miners' strike
(with implications for subsequent repression under the
Nationalists). He Identified this ideology with the Influence of
the Chamber of Mines, and traces It back to 19436' (in September
1943 the Chamber had complained to the Minister of Native Affairs
about Communist activity)62. Whilst 1 agree with Moodie that
ant I-communism strengthened the Chamber's case against African
unions, the origin of the anti-communist campaign is to be found
elsewhere and at an earlier date. As we have seen, state
officials were complaining of 'communistic' Influence amongst
Africans at least as far back as 1937, but it was Smuts, In early
1943 who provided the real boost to the movement.
P. Walshe has argued that: ' industrial unrest and the
impending general election had led to a change In atmosphere'. 6 3
Whilst he may be correct about the impending general election, he
does not produce any evidence and I am not aware that there Is
any. If winning elections was Smuts' prime concern, then surely,
in April 1942, he would have been aware that the introduction of
the amendment would occur immediately before a 1943 election. It
might be argued that Smuts was responding to the electorate's
heightened awareness of 'native problems' brought about by the
unrest.** If so, it is even clearer that it was, principally,
the 'unrest' that Led to the 'change in atmosphere'.
Another argument for the 'great change' is that advanced by
Eddie Roux and expanded by Baruch Hirson. The Roux-Hirson thesis
is that, to quote Hirson: 'Only at the end of 1942, when the tide
of war had turned, and the government regained its confidence,
were measures taken to curb the unions' . 6 5 I am uneasy about
this argument because it smacks of conspiracy theory (which,
however, can never be ruled out) and because, once again, there
Is no evidence to demonstrate Its validity.
In reading through Smuts' weekly diary-letters to Margaret
and Arthur Gillett, his friends in Britain, one can detect a
degree of correlation between his feelings on the war and the
'change': for most of the year he was fairly gloomy, but from
late November, he was more optimistic. But correlation should
never be taken to imply a causal relationship. His most
important letter, in this regard, is that dated 13 January 1943.
He mentions that there will probably be a general election later
in the year and that he is waiting to see how the war goes, but
he is still lacking confidence, because he adds: 'who knows what
may happen in 6 months' time?' Elsewhere in the same letter he
says: 'We are having a very difficult time with the Natives who
are getting Infected with the virus of change and unrest, and
have moreover fallen into the hands of our communists'. However,
he makes no connection between this passage and the previous one.
Unrest is linked to communists, but not to the war (or the
pending elect ion). &*
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We are left with a paradox: it was, 'In particular,
industrial unrest that encouraged the government to reconsider
the recognition question and it was mainly industrial unrest that
led them to reject recognition, at Least temporarily. However,
this apparent contradiction reflected a contradiction in reality:
between, on the one hand, capital's long term interest in the
development of a mutually beneficial relationship with African
union leaders and, on the other hand, a short term concern not to
appear to be backing down in the face of an increasingly
confident working class (as a correspondent to The Star put it:
'To give a big present is a sign of fear').*7 This short term
concern combined with the conservative pressure applied by the
Chamber of Mines, to ensure the defeat of the recognition
proposal.
Made ley's Conference
When the cabinet decided not to proceed with the amendment they
were reacting to events and they did not have a clear alternative
for dealing with African unions. The only conclusion which had
been reached was a negative one, which probably emanated from
Smuts himself, that, in relation to industrial relations
legislation, Africans and non-Africans should be treated
differently.*0 In March, this reinforcement of the divisions
within the working class was justified by Made ley as follows.
Such action [the redefinition of 'employee'] would
. , . endanger our industrial counciI system, as in
some industries where native trade unions are well
organized, these bodies, consisting entirely of
unskilled workers, would become the sole or
principal representatives of the employees, to the
exclusion of some of the existing artisans' trade
unions. Whatever views individuals may hold as to
the rights or wrongs of such a state of affairs,
no one can doubt that it would break up the
Industrial councils concerned and lead to
industrial chaos.**
The cabinet wanted to delay consideration of what had become
a very thorny problem, but they could not entirely remove it from
their agenda. As Madeley put it: 'Native trade unions continue
to multiply, and it is feared that many of them are of mushroom
growth'.70 This created two secondary problems for the
government. First, the African unions had developed a number of
important allies: the ANC and NRC, the Africans' parliamentary
representatives, the Institute of Race Relations and the Friends
of Africa, and the SATLC. The government could not afford to
lose the confidence of this weighty informal alliance, certainly
not in the middle of a war which had been condemned by the
Nationalists. At the end of March, Madeley announced that he
would be convening a conference of interested parties to 'try to
hammer out something' with regard to African trade unions.71 The
conference, which was eventually held in October 1943, was
probably a concession to, in particular, the parliamentary
-14-
representatives, but It was also a usefut'delaying tactic for a
government facing an election and uncertain of its position.
Secondly, government officials, particularly the District
Inspectors, and employers (to whom I shall return) still had to
deal with the practical problems created by African unions. The
Acting District Inspector for Johannesburg expressed himself
thus:
These unions by virtue of the fact that their
members comprise persons who are excluded from the
definition of employee in the Industrial
Conciliation Act are not subject to the control
which this Act provides for European trade unions.
... I have been asked by employers in several
instances recently whether ... [they] should grant
the union facilities to organise. I have also
been asked which of two apparently overlapping
unions should be recognised.72
The initial proposal was for a conference on African trade
unions which would have been overwhelmingly white. However, Smit
asked that four members of the NRC (one from each province) be
invited, and this was accepted; subsequently the ANC were also
asked to send a delegate. After protests from CNETU, the
Institute of Race Relations and Basner, CNETU was invited to send
two delegates. This encouraged further protests on the grounds
that CNETU was not a national organisation of African unions.
The DL consequently invited the Cape Federation of Labour and
Durban Trades Council to nominate two African delegates each,
both Port Elizabeth and East London Trades Councils to nominate
one, the Pretoria Joint Council of Non-European Trade Unions to
nominate two, and CNETU to nominate another two. Thus, the
conference became a much larger and 'blacker' affair.73 It
reflected the growth of trade unionism among Africans, which, by
194-3, had spread well beyond the Southern Transvaal.
In the course of 1943, African unions and the left, inspired
by the CPSA, organised two kinds of events in support of the
campaign for iC Act recognition. The first were general
mobilising activities, aimed at demonstrating that African
workers backed the demand for recognition under the IC Act.
According to reports in the Guardian: 800 Africans marched
through the centre of Pretoria, Port ELizabeth CNETU held a mass
rally attended by over 2,500 people, 1,200 workers went to a mass
meeting called by the Durban Communist Party, and 2,000 attended
a CNETU rally in Johannesburg. Today, these protests may seem
rather small, but the Port Elizabeth gathering was said to be the
largest political meeting in the City's history.7*
Secondly, in October, two conferences, one in Johannesburg
and one in Durban, backed well written memoranda spelling out
their arguments.7"3 They were especially concerned to deal with
the issue which Madeley had raised in parliament: the practical
implications of recognition for the industrial councils. The
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Durban memorandum stated: 'We regard this'as a question for the
Trade Unions to solve on their own, to the mutual satisfaction of
European and African workers, without any official interference'.
According to the Johannesburg document, the African unions
supported the principle of, to quote a COSATU slogan, 'one
industry one union', and by extension, to quote the document,
'complete unity between African and European workers'. However,
If negotiations between an existing registered union and an
African union were unsatisfactory, the African union should still
be registered. Industrial Council representation would then be a
'matter for agreement between it and the European Unions on the
one hand and the employers on the other1. If necessary,
continued the Johannesburg submission, provision could be made
for 'a separate Industrial Council to be established on which the
employers and the African workers will sit1.
And so, to the conference. Overwhelmingly, the delegates
spoke the language of democracy. They spoke with different
accents, but the message was the same. 7e> Every black person that
spoke, and most of the whites, argued in favour of IC Act
recognition. C. K. Sakwe of the NRC said that he came from a
rural area, from the Transkei, and there, he said, 'the demand
for such recognition is fully supported'. Prof. Matthews argued
that there had been a 'vast change' since the Act was first
passed, and warned that there was no chance of industrial peace
if Africans were excluded from the Act.
There were, however, three dissenters: the white delegates
from the SATLC. The General Secretary, Willie De Vries, told the
conference that the SATLC backed the request to amend the
definition of 'employer', but, he added: 'it was doubtful whether
natives were sufficiently developed to take a full share of
responsibility in the administration of Industrial Councils and
agreements'. The SATLC President, A. J. Downes, who, like De
Vries, had once worked with Walker in the Government Printing
Works,77 added that:
Although the Trades and Labour Council has on
several occasions passed resolutions for the
removal of the restrictions imposed by the Act he
did not think that the implications were
appreciated ... Whether it is accepted or not
there is a race and colour prejudice in this
country. ... The European Trade Union movement
agrees that the African workers should have the
right to organise and express their views, but
this should be done through European
representatives if there is likely to be any
difficulty as a result of direct representation.
Makabeni protested that the argument about ' insufficient
development' was 'without foundation1. 'Africans', he said, 'have
proved their capability to organise workers and conduct trade
unions', and he added that, 'European trade union leaders have
not organised employees under similar circumstances'. Lucas
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Phtllps, one of the delegates whose level of development had been
called into question, commented, tongue in cheek: 'It is curious
to learn from the Council's delegates that the implications ,..
were not appreciated'. He added that, 'the African
representatives ask for an amendment with a full understanding of
all the implications'. Then, he dealt with the possibility,
which Smit had raised in the meeting, of whites being 'ousted
from industrial councils':
There are unions in the Cape which consist
predominantly of Africans but they serve under
Europeans and there has been no complaint of
unfair domination. There are also unions
consisting chiefly of Coloureds but with Africans
as secretaries and here also there has been no
complaint ... The Brick and Tile Workers' Union
consists mainly of Africans, with some coloureds
and only a few Europeans; The question arises
whether the few Europeans could form their own
union and influence the employers. In his opinion
the answer is negative. The Africans have acted
on behalf of the Europeans in connection with
representations to the Wage Board. There exists
no racial division.
The Europeans and Africans are all workers.
They have a common struggle against the employers
who are not concerned with race distinctions but
are influenced by cheap labour.
No matter how well the majority expressed themselves, they
could not alter the speeches made by the SATLC leadership.
Forty-nine years later, Ray Alexander, who was a delegate from
CFL, recalled how 'disgusted' she felt. She said that in the
course of the conference she went up to one of the SATLC
delegates and said: 'You are traitors. You are traitors not only
to the present generation, but to future generations of
workers.'7* But, was the intervention of the 'gang of three1 the
'decisive' blow against the campaign for IC Act recognition, as
suggested by Simons and Simons?T*
In a DL memorandum, drawn up after the conference, there was
no mention of the position adopted by the SATLC delegates.
Rather, it was stated that: 'It was made very clear during
discussions that the natives, supported by the majority of the
trade union representatives, would be satisfied with nothing less
than the complete recognition of Native trade unions under the
Industrial Conciliation Act 1. 0 0 The memorandum continued: 'The
question whether this demand - and it is now generally put
forward by its protagonists in the shape of a 'demand' - should
be acceded to is a matter of Government policy* . That is, the
government had, prior to Madeley' s conference, already rejected
the possibility of simply amending the definition of 'employee'.
Thus, Madeley had allowed the delegates to proceed under a
misapprehension. Perhaps he had hoped that there would be
greater support for a 'half-way-house' solution; probably he was
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just carrying out his promise to parliament. So, at least in
immediate terms, Simons and Simons were mistaken. The archival
evidence indicates that the decisive blow had occurred in the
latter half of 1942.
After the conference, Made ley established a small committee
to consider the form of recognition which should be extended to
African trade unions. The committee consisted of Walker, Smit
and the Secretary for Mines <who was opposed to any form of
recognition). This committee produced a memorandum which
concluded that, two years earlier statutory recognition 'might
have been acceptable to the natives', but this was no longer the
case. It proposed an amendment to the IC Act which would allow
for the registration of African unions, but prohibit Africans
from joining non-African unions. Also, in opposition to Walker,
the majority argued that these provisions should not apply to the
mines.01 It was intended that these proposals should be
considered by the cabinet, but this never happened. The
memorandum was dated 8 January 1944, and on 6 January the cabinet
decided not to introduce any legislation aimed at recognising
African trade unions.02 It is not clear how or why Madeley's
preparation for a cabinet discus ion was pre-empted, but it would
seem that he was out-manoeuvred by the Minister of Mines, In
effect, it was decided to bury the issue until after the war.
The African Unions had made it clear that they would reject
minor concessions which stopped short of equality under the IC
Act. At the same time, nothing had shifted the government from
its determination to reinforce the division between African and
non-African workers. Indeed, probably as a result of pressure
from mining Interests, the government had, for the time being at
least, decided against any form of recognition other than the de
facto recognition which already existed.
The SATLC and White Workers
Should the behaviour of Downes and co. be interpreted as the
white working class deserting their African brothers and sisters?
I think not. First, it is worth recalling that, at the
conference, the CFL delegates rejected the arguments of the SATLC
delegates, and the CFL subsequently backed a CPSA initiated
campaign for IC Act recognition.03 One of the CFL delegates was
Raymound Budd, an office bearer In the Amalgamated Engineering
Union (AEU). °* He argued that, as far as the Cape was concerned,
'the race prejudice issue is practically a dead letter'. 'Race
prejudice1 was certainly more of an issue in the Transvaal, but
even there many white trade unionists were willing to accept the
proposal to redefine 'employee1. For example, on 29 October,
nine leading white trade unionists from Pretoria signed a
memorandum which contained arguments similar to those in the
Johannesburg memorandum. The nine included: the Branch Secretary
of the Iron Moulders Society, the Secretary of the Trades and
Labour Committee, the General Secretary of the Mint Employees
Union and the Branch Chair of the Tailoring Workers' Union.05
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Thus, to the extent that the white working class had an opinion
on the matter, it was divided.
The reality, however, was more complex than a simple
regional or political polarisation. For example, the SATLC
National Executive, dominated by the right wing, elected Koza as
Its fourth delegate to Madeley's conference; he was the first
(and probably the last) African to represent the SATLC. A
discussion at the 1941 SATLC provides a clue to the dichotomy.
That year, Koza and Alexander moved a motion which called for the
IC Act to be amended so that 'alt non-European workers can be
represented directly by members of their own unions on the
various industrial councils'. This motion was rejected by the
conference (28 votes to 34). Thus, the SATLC held contradictory
positions: for regarding Africans as equal before the law, but
against regarding them as equal before the industrial councils.
In part, this reflected a contradiction between an identification
with broad class interests and an identification with narrower
sectional concerns.
In the course of the 1941 discussion, Downes argued: 'Given
time ... the native would be given a member to represent his
union directly, but for the time [being] the European had to hold
the trusteeship of the native worker in Industry1.06 If anybody
In South Africa could be described as a ' labour aristocrat' it
was Downes, the representative of the Typographical Union (SATU).
His argument not only reflected the immediate interests of his
members, it also reflected the immediate reality of their
industry, where there was a huge cultural gap between the highly
skilled artisans, who were nearly all white, and the labourers,
who were mostly African. This was appreciated by Koza when, at
Madeley's conference, he argued that: 'The real difficulty is
that most [registered] unions are craft unions which are hostile
towards the unskilled and semi-skilled groups which include
Europeans'. He added, 'The objection is, therefore, not directed
against employees of a certain race but a certain class of
worker1.
There was also evidence of racism among less skilled whites,
and where it occurred, as amongst the Garment Workers, it was
usually more virulent In character than the paternalism of
Downes. However, among the less skilled there were also common
interests between black and white workers, and sometimes common
action. The best examples involved white women workers, where
the skill/'race' divide was generally less marked. For example,
at the end of 1943, there was a national shop workers' strike
which, at least in Johannesburg, united members of the National
Union of Distributive Workers (NUDW) and members of the ACDWU.
Significantly, the one registered union which, In this period,
sent a pro-recognition resolution to Madeley, was the
Johannesburg branch of the NUDW, °7
At the 1944 SATLC Conference Koza moved a motion which
called for 'the deletion of the restrictive provisions of the
definition "employee"'. The resolution was lost on a card vote
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<17,198 to U,859>, The card vote was recorded, and It makes
interesting reading. The organisations voting with Koza amounted
to 44 industrial unions (mostly small, but including the Garment
Workers' and the NUDW) and only three
artisan/supervisory/clerical unions (including the Building
Workers'). Among the bodies voting against the resolution were
eleven artisan/supervisory/clerical unions, including the three
largest unions (the Mine Workers', the AEU and the Municipal
Employees), but onty seven industrial unions (all small).00
Skill was not the only factor at work - the politics of the
leadership was another - but skill-level was certainly important
in shaping workers' attitudes.
One way of handling the contradiction between class
interests and sectional concerns, between what you think you
ought to do and what you feel is advantageous, was to try to
ignore the problem. This was probably widespread. Its not that
that the white unions were racist, more that they did not care.
For instance, during the six years of the war, the AEU's Monthly
Report carried only one article about racism or Africans.®'
However, these issues could not be ignored for ever. The July
1944- edition contained a complaint from Budd, who was a delegate
to the SATLC Conference, that the AEU delegation had voted
contrary to their union's constitution (which, in that it
provided for an open membership, was unusual for an artisan
union,).90 Significantly, the AEU had voted with Koza in 1941,
but against him in 1944. T1
Jon Lewis has demonstrated that the shift in racial thinking
within 'white' unions, which occurred during the war years, was
related to changes in the labour process, and, in particular, to
the development of mechanisation in engineering.*2 With the
increased proportion of Africans in industry, and, in particular,
with some Africans beginning to be employed in semi-skilled
positions, there was a growing unease among many of the whites.
It was one thing to agree to equality under he IC Act when
Africans were the minority and disorganised; it was altogether
different if Africans were the majority and well organised. Most
white workers, certainly the artisans, were, In relation to most
African workers, well off. They were caught between, on the one
hand, wanting to look-after the 'under-privileged1, and on the
other hand, feeling threatened by them. This attitude was not
dissimilar to the paternalism of Smuts (who was, however, much
closer to the Chamber, and sometimes hostile to the artisans).
The conclusion seems to have been: help the Africans when they
are weak (but not too much), back-off when they start organising.
There was, as Basner had noted, a shift in attitudes sometime
around 1942.
One further point should be made. Madeley was a Labour
leader and a member and a member of the cabinet; he had ties to
the right-wing of the SATLC, most of whom were Labour Party
members, and he had ties to Smuts. Who better than Madeley to
convince the SATLC of the need for a new approach. He not only
knew what to justify, but, given the uneasiness of many white
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workers, how to justify it. In February -194-4, the caucus of
Labour MPs and Senators voted not to support the CFL's campaign
for 1C Act recognition (which had been Labour Party policy), and
they thereby firmed-up the shift in attitude within the dominant
right-wing of the white labour movement. * 3
Although the shift in attitude among white workers was not
the cause of the change in government policy, it made it easier
to sustain that change. Moreover the behaviour of the 'gang of
three1, which underlined that shift, probably damaged the morale
of those African trade unionists who had been campaigning to
change the law. Thus, although, in the short term, the actions
of the SATLC leadership was not decisive, taking a longer view,
it was an important factor undermining the possibility of
securing equality for African workers.
Industrial Employers
The South African Federated Chamber of Industries (SAFCI) was the
most representative voice of manufacturing capital, and in 1944
it claimed to be backed by approximately S9 percent of the
country's secondary industry.'* However, although some
Individual engineering companies were affiliated, the South
African Federation of Engineering and Metallurgic Associations
(SEIFSA's predecessor), along with the associations of some other
industries (including building), remained outside the 'ambit of
the Chambers activities'." Furthermore, the SAFCI was dominated
by the bigger capitalists, although domestic and foreign capital
were both represented on its Executive CounciI. **
Although, from 1943, the contribution which manufacturing
made to the national economy outstripped that of mining, the
SAFCI was much less influential than the Chamber of Mines,
Indeed, during the war years, it is probable that the government
placed greater weight on the opinions of the SATLC than those of
the SAFCI. For instance, the SATLC had provided an advisory
committee for the Prime Minister from mid-1942, but a similar
employers' advisory committee was not established until after
mld-1944. *7 The greater influence of the Chamber was mainly a
product of economic factors (particularly the mining industry's
contribution to government and export revenue), but arose partly
from the organisational weakness of the SAFCI. The SAFCI was
brought into being, in 1917, through the federation of seven
regional Chambers of Industries, and these Chambers, and the
affiliated organisations representing particular industries,
retained considerable authority.
On the issue of African union recognition, the SAFCI moved
slowly and uncertainly. During 1939, the General Secretary
informed the Executive Council that the government was
'instituting an inquiry into the desirability of natives forming
themselves into trade unions', but the Council resolved: 'that no
further action be taken unless the Chamber received a direct
request from the Government for an expression of opinion1.90 In
1942, the Transvaat Chamber of Industries (TCI) made a submission
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to the Smit Committee, but the SAFCI limited Itself to asking its
constituent organisations for their opinions; the only one that
responded was the Natal Chamber (NCI), which supported the TCI.**
The TCi's submission to the Smit Committee was, however, of
some interest. According to Dave Lewis, they argued that the
growth of unions among Africans was ' inevitable', and that, ' it
would be unjust to refuse recognition to workers of one race when
those of all other races have been statutorily recognised1. 1 O°
However, the Executive Council of the TCI added that: 'this
chamber is in favour of the establishment of native trade unions
provided that they, and more particularly their secretariat, are
under the guidance and control of the Native Affairs
Department1.101 That Is, the TCI's position was far from
progressive: they desired a form of recognition which had already
been firmly rejected by black organisations, established trade
unions, and the DL and DNA. This is rather different from the
impression provided by Lewis.
The 1942 unrest left Its mark on the SAFCI. In January
1943, its Executive Council debated 'Labour Disputes and
Agitators', Mr. A. G, Tainton, of Pretoria Portland Cement,
argued that: 'Industrialists were up against a national crisis as
concerned the labour question ...'. Mr. A. H. Burmeister, of the
Soap and Candle Manufacturers' Association, said that: 'This
question of labour was one that had developed seriously within
the past three or four months.'102 At this meeting the NCI,
proposed the creation of an 'Employers' Confederation' separate
from the SAFCI. They wanted a new national organisation (with
local sections) which, because it would be purely concerned with
labour questions, could secure a broader base of members. They
further proposed that: 'All labour disputes would be referred to
this body and there would be no piece-meal settlement with
individual firms'. They also recommended summary action against
labour agitators.103 Natal's proposal for an 'Employers'
Confederation1 was rejected by the SAFCI, but, on 1 April 1943,
the NCI went ahead and established the desired body, calling it
the Industrial Employers' Association (Natal Section) (1EA). 1 O*
At the end of 1943, the SAFCI's Executive Council agreed
that: ' if possible, propaganda be made for the acceptance by the
Government of the recommendation of the Interdepartmental [Smit]
Committee1. 1 O S Meanwhile, the IEA was developing its own policy.
Like the SAFCI, the IEA represented the bigger capitalists, both
domestic and foreign; indeed, some companies that were
represented on the SAFCIls Executive Council were also
represented on the IEA's much smaller General Council.106 It is
not surprising, therefore, that the IEA adopted a position
similar to that of the SAFCI. In November 1943, the IEA informed
the Secretary for Native Affairs that they ' in no way opposed1 to
the recognition of African unions as recommended in the Smit
Report.10' So, neither the SAFCI nor the IEA were willing to
recommend anything more than the Smit Committee's proposal for
'administrative recognition1, which Smit himself had by then
rejected (because it would not be accepted by Africans).100
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However, there was a 'harder' edge to the 1EA1s policy,
perhaps reflecting the different experiences of industrialists in
Natal. Thus Windsor added: 'the appointment of Officials of such
Unions should be subject to the approval of some Government
Authority, with a view to the exclusion of persons of the labour
agitator class'. However, in February 1945, following a meeting
with the Durban Local Committee of the SATLC and others
(including a representative of the DL>, the 1EA modified its
position slightly. They now envisaged some change in the law.
They proposed: 'that a board of Authority be set up by the
Government to supervise and guide the activities of all African
Trade Unions and to approve all applications by such Unions for
recognition and/or registration'. However, they also argued:
'once recognition and/or registration of a union has been granted
... it shall be the duty of every industrial Council, Employers'
Organisation or Association and every employer in the Trade or
Industry concerned to recognise and negotiate wit such
union' , 1O*
The new resolution was forwarded to the government with the
support of the IEA, the NCi and the Natal Chamber of Commerce,
but, in April 1945, the SAFC1, at its half-yearly meeting, agreed
to give its backing to the policy.110 For the first time,
manufacturing capital was fully united in its response to the
recognition question. They desired the registration of African
trade unions, but under strict controls, and certainly not on the
basis of equality with other trade unions.
Subsequently the SAFCI appointed a high-powered committee on
industrial legislation. The majority, including former Wage
Board Chairman, Frank McGregor, recommended full recognition
under the Act, but the IEA's General Secretary, W. H. Windsor,
submitted a minority report. The difference between them is
instructive. The majority saw their proposal as the only
practical form of recognition, since they doubted whether any
other would be acceptable to the 'Natives'. Windsor rejected
this on the grounds that: 'Industries in Natal are in a very
similar position to the Mines as the greater part of the Native
Labour employed is comprised of Tribal Natives from the
Reserves'.111 There may have been other reasons for not backing
the majority position. Thus, at a 1945 SAFCI Executive Council,
Louis Marks (TCI) mentioned the concerns of the mining industry,
and Mr. Begley (NCI) added that 'secondary industry could not
afford to antagonise' the mining industry.112 The SAFCI 1946
Convention refused to make a decision on the report, and McGregor
resigned from the committee 'due to pressure of work1. 1 1 3 It is
not clear what happened next, but, by 1951, 'the call from
industry for recognition had become less urgent, and concentrated
on the need for regulatory machinery1. l t*
'These Things are insoluble1
Early in 1945, Smuts, referring 'to our Native problem', told a
small lunch party: 'these things are insoluble1. Recognition of
African unions was probably the Government's most pressing
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1
 Native problem', it was certainly their'"most difficult, and it
did indeed prove to be 'insoluble'.115
In the course of 194-5, the DL began to draft legislation
which eventually acquired the title Industrial Conciliation
(Native) Bill. The main features of this bill were five fold.
First, a ban on Africans being members of any unions other than
those registered under the proposed Act. Secondly, strict
criteria to be applied before an African union could be
recognised. Thirdly, disputes to be resolved by a 'Central
Mediation Board1, which would have the power to enforce its
decisions; this board would consist of a chairman appointed by
the Governor-General, a parliamentary representative of Africans,
and one person appointed by each of the Ministers of Labour,
Native Affairs and Commerce. Fourthly, a ban on strikes.
Fifthly, African mine workers were excluded from the
provisions. 1'*
The guiding principle of the Bill was that there should be
separate legislation for African and non-African workers. It was
Smuts who insisted that this should be the case, and later, in
194-7, he told Parliament that African unions should be recognised
'on a basis of apartheid so that unnecessary difficulties will
not arise1. t17 This was an attempt to appease potential
opposition from the Chamber of Mines, the South African
Agricultural Union and the Nationalists. However, these powerful
forces continued to stand by their position of opposing any
recognition of African union. lie
In October 1945, before the Bill had been completed, Ivan
Walker let it be known that the Government was intending to
introduce legislation which would not provide Africans with equal
rights under the 1C Act. This brought forth a barrage of
protests from African unions and their usual supporters.119 The
SATLC was, in some measure, divided. Oownes informed the
government's Advisory Council of Labour that: 'inclusion of
Natives in [the] present [ IC1 Act would create uproar in the
unions1.120 However, on behalf of the SATLC, De Vries wrote: 'We
contend a n workers, irrespective of sex, race or colour should
be governed by the same legislation and the activities of all
workers' organisations should be the concern of only one State
Department, viz Department of Labour. '1Z1 However, the SATLC
united in opposing the Bill, partly because it prevented the
registered unions from recruiting Africans (some of the older
unions, such as SATU, had been persuaded of the value of
organising parallel unions for Africans).1ZZ
The Government, having failed to secure 'sufficient
consensus1 for the Bill, announced that they would not be
proceeding with it in the 1946 session. Although, it was
subsequently published, later, following the 1946 election, it
was withdrawn by the Nationalists, who then appointed an
Industrial Legislation Commission of Inquiry (the Botha
Commission). The new government eventually passed the Native
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Labour Act of 1953, but until then War Measure 14-5 remained in
force.
Conclusion
Merle Llpton has presented the following contrast between the
attitudes of white labour and white business:
Only the Cape Federation supported the 194-3
proposal to recognise African unions (as the FCI
and Assocom urged). The TLC argued that Africans
had 'not yet reached a stage of mental and
cultural development in which they can be
entrusted with the rights and duties involved in
recognition of their unions'. The 1951 Industrial
Legislation Commission gave a more candid
explanation, acknowledging that many African
unions were well run and that many Africans were
able and ambitious and, if allowed to secure
parity of bargaining power, 'could not be
restricted indefinitely to unskilled or even semi-
skilled work, but would get an increasing hold on
skilled occupations' - one of the reasons why
there was more support for African unions from
white capital than from white labour. 1 2 3
Without doubt, Lipton is wrong. In 1943, the SATLC
supported full IC Act recognition, as demanded by the African
unions. By contrast, the SAFCI supported nothing more than the
'administrative recognition1 that Smit appreciated was
unacceptable to those unions. It is absurd to suggest that
'there was more support for African unions from white capital
than from white labour'. The representatives of industrial
capitat considered that African trade unions were inevitable, but
that they should be more adequately controlled by whites. The
most powerful section of 'white capital', mining capital, was
totally opposed to African unions. Whilst I have no desire to
condone the SATLC, the position of white workers was more complex
than Lipton suggests, and even the Industrial Legislation
Commission noted that: 'some witnesses, who represented the
orthodox trade-union view, stressed that all workers should have
the right to be regarded as employees to ensure the solidarity of
the working class1. When African workers went on strike they
were generally supported by white labour, but they were always
opposed by 'white capital'. I Z*
The two main protagonists - both of which adopted a more or
less consistent line throughout the period - were black labour
(supported by the ANC and NRC) and mining capital. Neither white
labour nor industrial capital were homogeneous; both were subject
to contradictory pressures. However, white labour tended to
identify more closely with black labour than with mining capital,
whilst, for industrial capital, the reverse was true. This was
reflected in use of language. The SATLC generally used the term
'Africans', a practice which was deplored by the SAFCI, who
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Inslsted on 'Natives'; 1 2 S the SATLC usually spoke of
'recognition1, whilst the SAFCI was concerned with 'control'.
The Government's main aim was to limit the militancy of the
African unions. In mid-1942 they decided that in order to
achieve this, they would have to recognise African unions under
the 1C Act. However, they were unwilling to introduce this
change at a highpoint of militancy. Rather, as a result of the
unrest and the increasing unity between Africans and non-
Africans, the government decided to reinforce existing racial
divisions among workers. Under pressure from mining capital, and
without strong pressure from white labour, they searched for some
means of exercising 'control' without acceding to equality, but,
lacking significant support from the African unions, this was
futile.
The refusal to grant recognition at a highpoint of militancy
had similarities with the pattern of events in the 1920s and the
1970s. The original 1C Act was introduced after the defeat of
1922; the extension of the Act to Include Africans did not occur
at the peak of militancy, in 1973, or even in 1974, but in 1979,
when the level of strike action was very much lower. 1 Z 6 In 1924
and in 1979, recognition was agreed as a result of class struggle
and in order, in the long term, to reduce that struggle, but it
was not conceded at a peak point in the struggle. Whilst there
are similarities between 1924 and 1979 the circumstances were not
the same, and nor was the outcome. In particular, 1979 was not
followed by decades of quiescence. This was probably related to
the inability of capitalism to concede significant material
improvements to black workers and to its failure, at least
initially, to concede equal political rights. Indeed, whilst the
post-Wiehahn industrial legislation might be in the long term
interests of capitalism, in the shorter term, it provided workers
with greater opportunities for legal organisation, and those
opportunities were grasped to secure political as well as
economic improvements. It is possible, although there is no
evidence for this, that one reason why Smuts was unwilling to
concede IC Act equality is that it would have had inevitable
further consequences: if there was industrial equality, why not
political equality too?
It is not difficult to explain why Smuts should concede
recognition to non-Africans in 1924 but refuse it to Africans in
1942. On both occasions, he appreciated the benefits of
reinforcing racial divisions. But why was recognition conceded
to African trade unions in the 1970s but not in the 1940s? Some
answers could be suggested as possibilities. First, the level of
strike action in 1973 was rather higher than in 1942. I recently
interviewed Jaap CiI tiers, who was an industrial inspector in the
war years and the Director General of Manpower at the time of the
Wiehahn Commission, and I asked why the Government introduced
recognition in the late-70's and not in the mid-40's. He
answered: 'International pressure and the militancy of the black
movement1.127 Thus, once the level of struggle had peaked, there
might have been a greater underlying pressure in the 1970s. One
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should add, however, that the level of trade union membership
among Africans was almost certainly higher in the mld-1940s than
it was in the mid-1970s.120 Perhaps more significantly, by the
mid-'70s, mining capital was divided on the issue of recognition,
with Anglo-American and JC1 catling for trade union rights for
Africans. 1E*
In alt the main events of this recognition drama, Smuts
played a prominent part. Although he was a powerful figure, he
was incapable of reconciling the conflict between the immediate
interests of mining capital and the desire for long term
stability. It is only possible to understand the recognition
question if we situate the state within the context of class
conflict; only if we do this accurately, can we glimpse a
solut ion.
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